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The literature on transitions and democratization overwhelmingly supports the idea that 
opposition parties should pursue tactics akin to those used in Westminster and other Western 
democracies, and those the choice to pursue extra-parliamentary opposition tactics is ultimately 
anti-democratic. In particular, there is a popular consensus that opposition participation in 
boycotts prevents the development of democracy. This dissertation takes a critical look at this 
conjecture, evaluating its plausibility in the first dedicated mixed-methods study of parliamentary 
and electoral boycotts as extra-parliamentary opposition tactics. I argue that the choice to 
condemn the use of boycotts takes too narrow a view of the utility of extra-parliamentary tactics 
in new democracies. I support this claim through the use of case study analysis and dynamic 
panel data analysis, for which I constructed, using event data, the most extensive dataset on 
electoral boycotts and the first dataset on legislative boycotts. My findings in both parts show 
that there is indeed no difference between the likelihood that a country that experiences a boycott 
and a country which does not will experience good or improved democratic governance, refuting 
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Chapter 1: An Introduction to the Boycott as an Extra-Parliamentary Tactic 
 
In early 1997, a ghost appeared in the National Assembly of South Korea. President Kim 
Dae Jung and his National Congress party had called for hearings to investigate the question of 
culpability following South Korea’s economic turmoil during the East Asian Financial Crisis. 
Several key figures of the preceding administration, including former President Kim Young-sam 
and his economic minister Kang Kyuk-Shik had been brought into parliament for this special 
investigation. When the economic crisis hit, dramatically depreciating the Korean won and 
causing investor panic and a banking crisis, Kang had been fired and then imprisoned on charges 
of negligence and abuse of power. Free on bail, the former minister was called to defend his 
actions in front of the National Assembly. Kim Dae Jung’s decision to hold hearings on the 
financial crisis two years after the fact was marketed as a way to determine the causes of the 
crisis, inform the public about what went wrong, and what South Korea could do to prevent the 
issue from arising again (Baker 1999).  
In the eyes of the New Korea Party (NKP) and Liberty Korea Party (GNP)—President 
Kim Young-sam’s National Congress party’s leading oppositions and the parliamentary majority 
parties—and other critics, this stated goal was deceptive. It had been two years since the 
financial crisis, and Korea was in recovery. The main economic and political causes of the crisis 
were considered to be fairly well known; the latter included poor macroeconomic policy, 
overzealous deregulation, weak monitoring of economic institutions, and the chaos of party 
politics and “blame games” in a legislative election year (Haggard and Mo, 2000). The hearings 
were unpopular, as both the public and the opposition considered them to be another sort of 
political game. In fact, international articles about the start of these hearings predicted that they 




correct when the opposition declared its intention to boycott the legislature while the hearings 
were underway. 
While the public mostly viewed these hearings as unnecessary, the opposition went a step 
further and characterized them as a tool of defamation and political vengeance, amounting to a 
political witch hunt (Baker 1999; Wall Street Journal 1999). They saw this as a continuation of a 
South Korean political tradition where the new leadership would punish or humiliate the old 
leadership. Now that the most pressing concerns of the economic crisis had been handled, they 
interpreted the hearings as the latest event in this tradition. Baker cites an opposition member 
who criticizes the decision, saying that members of the public “know [who] was responsible” 
and that the hearings were a ploy to cement Kim’s power in South Korea (1999).  
The hearings continued without the presence of the opposition, but their demonstration 
caught the attention of the public as well as the international audience. The financial crisis had 
political as well as economic consequences, resulting in heightened tensions between political 
parties. The world was watching South Korea, a country which had recently returned to 
democracy, to see what would happen. This public stage amplified the message being sent by the 
opposition, which called for movement beyond the political machinations of past leaders (which 
had been condemned by all parties, as long as they were serving as the opposition).  
There is not much more English-language coverage of the parliamentary hearings or the 
boycott surrounding them, but this movement by the South Korean opposition is exemplary of 
the political goals of opposition parliamentary boycotts—in this case, drawing attention to 
government practices that they viewed as undemocratic. Oppositions around the world have 
many political goals and a plethora of tactics through which to pursue them, some of which 




parliamentary tactics. Legislative and electoral boycotts are two methods that produce some of 
the strongest signals oppositions can send when they believe they face no possibility of 
satisfaction within institutions. This dissertation investigates choices to boycott, like that made 
by the South Korean opposition in January 1999, and the complicated story of how these 
boycotts affect the development of democratic governance in the long-run. 
The Importance of Oppositions   
The concept of effective democratic governance elicits many images in the minds of its 
citizens, but particularly conjures that of representatives from different political parties debating, 
writing legislation, and working together within the legislature. In fact, E.E. Schattschneider 
famously stated that “modern democracy is unthinkable save in terms of the parties” (1942, 1). 
Even casual observation shows that politics in most modern democracies is comprised of a series 
of interactions between governing and opposition parties—in fact, opposition is so necessary to 
democracy that it is a major component of many of political science’s most influential definitions 
of the concept (Dahl 1967; Dahl 1973, Przeworski 2015; Cheibub and Przeworski 1999). As 
democracies have diversified due to post-war waves of democratization, however, we find that 
fewer and fewer democracies necessarily work in the way described above, where non-
government parties can fruitfully function as a parliamentary opposition; the parliamentary 
opposition is a Western model where the opposition has evolved to the point where it “acts as a 
critic of the party in power, developing, defining, and presenting the policy alternatives which 
are necessary for a true choice in reaching public decisions,” and awaits the next election for 
their turn for a role in government (Katz and Crotty 2006).  Still, casual and serious scholars of 
politics generally hold the normative assumption that parliamentary opposition is the best way to 




of political evolution and the emergence of democratic and representative governments, 
parliamentary oppositions have come to be seen as the preferred pattern of political opposition 
(Dahl 1967; Helms 2008; Hoftstadter 1969; Ionescu and de Madariaga 1968), despite an 
empirical understanding that opposition parties in new democracies are forming in environments 
that are sometimes dramatically different from their counterparts in Western Europe, and act 
accordingly. 
My dissertation is dedicated to observing the effects of extra-parliamentary strategies of 
opposition in new democracies—specifically, boycotting the legislature and boycotting 
elections—upon the development of democracy within these states. I examine the proposition 
that oppositions in countries which have not evolved according to the Western model may be 
able to achieve democratic outcomes despite functioning in a manner substantially different from 
the institutionalized parliamentary model, even to the extent that they seek to influence 
government outside of the walls of the legislative chamber. The suggestion that an opposition 
party’s extra-parliamentary strategies could have beneficial effects upon democratic 
development is not a radical idea. Scholars have long recognized the existence of non-party and 
extra-parliamentary paths of opposition, with many scholars including them in typologies of 
oppositions (Blondel 1997; Kolinsky 1987) despite largely subscribing to the normative belief 
that an institutionalized parliamentary opposition is most conducive to democratic rule. 
Consequently, alternative forms and patterns of opposition are generally held as a suboptimal 
category of political opposition acting outside the realm of politics (Tilly and Tarrow 2006). The 
evidence presented both in my case studies (Chapter 4) and statistical analysis (Chapter 5 and 6) 
show that boycotts cause mixed effects, underlying the need for this deeper understanding of 




The Role of Opposition Parties 
Historical analyses of the emergence of opposition in Western democracies paint a tale of 
gradual development. Ionescu and de Madariaga discuss the emergence of the political 
opposition—the “legitimate means through which power can be opposed”—through the 
development of liberal institutions and the emergence of public opinion as far back as the 
seventeenth century (1968, 3). The rise of pluralism emerged as a remedy for the political 
conflicts that characterize society—the conflict of interests and the conflict of values between 
groups. The emergence of civil society in the historical context allowed parliaments to become a 
place where members would advise and assist the ruler. Over time, these institutions themselves 
became the seats of sovereignty and the organs of representation, and political parties emerged as 
tools for groups with divergent interests. The parliament, as a home for political parties,  
began to develop ‘the constitutional remedy of opposition’. It acquired the function of an 
institution through which grievances could be ventilated and solved, not with the merely factional 
purpose of fomenting discontent, but with the genuine purpose of seeking a remedy; and it 
undertook the task of amending legislation with a view to improving it (Ionescu and de Madariaga 
1968, 54). 
The development of the opposition in Western Europe was not a smooth road, however. 
The English “formed opposition” was often considered disloyal and unrespectable, even through 
the 18th century (Hofstadter 1969, ix-x). The early days of the American system, too, resisted the 
emergence of political parties and considered party conflict to be inherently evil (ibid., 23). This 
belief is immortalized in The Federalist Papers #9 and #10, where Alexander Hamilton 
characterizes factions as “furious storms” composed of “tempestuous waves of sedition and party 
rage”; James Madison asserts that “the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of rival 
parties.” Still, in both systems, parties emerged, and political leaders learned that the best way to 
control political parties was to constrain them through the counterbalance of other parties. 




undesirable, they were just as inevitable (Hofstadter 1969, 18). The establishment of one political 
party eventually led to the emergence of additional parties. Public opinion naturally encompasses 
divergent policy preferences, which created factions in government which led to the emergence 
of rival parties (Ionescu and de Madaraiga 1968). 
As a result, Western political systems warmed up to the opposition and these parties 
became more than just electoral challengers to the regime but embraced the role of an alternative 
government (Hofstadter 1969; Ionescu and de Madariaga 1968, 51-57; Parry 1997). This is the 
primary function of oppositions in Western democracies—to serve as an alternative government, 
recommending alternative policies, criticizing the choices of the current government, aiming to 
thwart or initiate policy changes where possible, and awaiting the next election wherein they 
hope to be asked by the people to exercise power. This structure of opposition is most obvious in 
the Westminster system, where the opposition status is formally designated and enshrined as 
“loyal” (to the crown or, broadly, the state itself, even when opposed to the temporary 
government of the day). Of course, the traditional opposition is embedded with more goals and 
functions than simply serving as an alternative government. Ludgar Helms (2008) states that the 
opposition’s original role was to limit the power of the government and constrain the actions of 
the executive. 
Through an analysis of opposition in established democracies, Helms (2004) describes 
five possible patterns of opposition, categorized by formal institutional rules. These patterns 
(summarized in Table 1) depend upon the institutional structure, rules on co-governing, and the 
status of minority parties within a polity. Different structures produce oppositions with different 
strengths. Some institutions allow for a strong opposition by giving parties the veto power, the 




or prime minister. Other states are characterized by institutions that severely limit the effects of 
the opposition parties by restricting co-governing powers.  
Table 1.1: Helms (2004) List of Opposition Patterns in Industrialized Democracies 
Pattern of Opposition Example 
Parliament-centered opposition with no veto/co-
governing powers for minority parties.  
United Kingdom 
Parliament-centered opposition with strong veto 
and/or cogoverning powers for the minority. 
Germany 
Parliamentary-presidential models of political 
opposition. 
France 
Separation-of-powers model of political 
opposition. 
United States 
Direct democratic model of political opposition. Switzerland 
For example, the opposition in Germany is endowed with formal powers and works within a 
system built upon power-sharing features. Instead of sitting and patiently awaiting election, the 
German opposition offers bills, negotiates policy compromises, and is a more direct participant 
in the legislative process. In France, on the other hand, the parliamentary-presidential model of 
opposition fosters an environment that can lead to the discontent of the opposition. The French 
system has been contentious since its inception, where oppositions were formed around 
divergent ideological trends in pursuit of different policies and in support of different values. The 
French opposition did not seek to provide an “alternative government” but was often anti-system, 
deciding they would need to overthrow the current government to achieve their goals (Ionescu 
and de Madariaga 1968, 61-62). In contemporary France, the weak position of parliamentary 
opposition is a relic of these times. In fact, the French system is the most similar to new 
democracies in Eastern Europe, as dissenting minorities often feel forced to abandon interparty 
politics and resort to extra-parliamentary actions in the face of institutions that severely restrain 




Academic discussions of opposition parties in democracies are typically separated into 
case or regional studies (Kopecky and Spirova 2008; Morgenstern, Negri and Peréz-Linán 2008; 
Rodan 1996; Schrire 2008; Tokes 1979; Webb and White 2007) and studies of specific types of 
institutional designs (Schapiro 1972). The divide is even more apparent when we look solely at 
the literature on new democracies. Scholars will typically look at Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
Africa, or East Asia in isolation, despite the fact that oppositions in these states often take similar 
forms or face comparable challenges (Webb and White 2007). For example, opposition parties in 
Latin America and Africa both rely on patronage and clientelism to court voters and, as a result, 
secure their role in parliament through the provision of localized goods. The establishment of an 
opposition in all regions is also hampered by the prevalence of personalist parties, created around 
one individual politician as a personal electoral vehicle and often contributing to high party 
volatility. Africa, Eastern Europe, and Latin America all face the challenge of presidential power 
which has prevented the establishment of a strong opposition by constraining the power of the 
legislative body itself, often forcing those who want change to look beyond institutional 
remedies. Finally, emerging democracies across the globe face the challenge of weak parties and 
weak party systems, which limit the establishment of an opposition akin to those we see in 
advanced democracies (Ames and Power 2007; Langston 2007; Szusterman 2007; Webb and 
White 2007). Such similar influences and constraints upon parties and the party system affords 
us an excellent opportunity to compare the effects of extra-parliamentary strategies at a cross-






Table 1.2: Comparing Oppositions in Old and New Democracies 
Advanced Democracies New Democracies 
How did/do opposition parties form? How did/do opposition parties form? 
Initially  
• The party structure emerged naturally through 
coordination in pursuit of similar goals and ideals.  
• Parties in advanced industrialized democracies 
went through the four-stage model, moving from 
cadre parties to mass parties, followed by catch-
all parties and then electoral-professional parties. 
Presently 
• When ties between the electorate weaken 
(evidenced by declines in party identification, 
party members, and partisan involvement), new 
parties can emerge in order to properly meet the 
aggregation of demand (Mair 1984).  
• Changes in the cultural domain that favor 
radicalization and polarization can cause the 
creation of new parties in order to meet new 
attitudinal demands (Ignazi 1992). 
At transition 
• Initially, the way that parties emerge depends 
highly upon the type of transition that took 
place (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Stepan 
1997). 
• Some political parties emerged out of 
formerly repressed social movements (Dahl 
1973). 
• Factional opposition may become actual 
opposition after the opening of a polity 
(Barghoorn 1967; Skilling 1967). 
• Other political parties were intentionally 
constructed to compete in pursuit of specific 
policies, to represent specific groups, or to 
benefit from political power itself.  
Presently 
• Much of the same motivation for the 
formation of parties continues, though parties 
are more likely to emerge in specific policy 
areas if the field is relatively open.  
 
How do opposition parties act? How do opposition parties act? 
Westminster model 
• The opposition party must wait for their time to 
make policy, but forms a shadow government in 
order to oppose the actions of the government. 
Other models 
• Opposition parties are able to argue, debate, and 
negotiate with the government party to shape 
policy. 
• In some countries, opposition parties are able to 
put forth competing bills and use their actions in 
the legislature to block the government party. 
Unelected 
• If unelected, opposition parties wait for the next 
election or fizzle out.  
• Opposition parties within the legislature are also 
constrained by similar features as advanced, 
industrialized democracies—veto powers (or lack 
thereof), etc.  
• Opposition parties are more likely to have an 






This improved understanding has been challenging to achieve primarily due to the lack of 
comparative discussion of opposition parties in their functional role in favor of opposition parties 
in the challenger role. When scholars do discuss the functional role—individual parties’ electoral 
strategies, policy proposals, and other activities—it tends to still be in the context of how 
oppositions will fare in future elections. The literature also faces a lack of discussion about the 
effects of opposition activities on governance and accountability. The importance of multiple 
party options for voters to choose from is obviously acknowledged for the endpoint of good 
governance and accountability, but once again scholars have not moved from considering the 
challenger role of oppositions to their functional role.  The only sustained discussion of 
outcomes that consider the actions of the opposition is in the regime transitions literature, where 
authors such as Blondel (1997) and Stepan (1990; 1997) show how opposition goals and actions 
work to weaken autocratic regimes and lead to the adoption of democratic institutions. 
In short, the current status of the literature leaves a lot of room for this dissertation 
project to shed light on how the extra-parliamentary actions of opposition parties affect their 
ability to contribute to good governance and accountability, and the subsequent prospects for 
democratic governance in emerging democracies. I can find no scholarly studies that directly 
address the main questions of this project, allowing it to serve as a distinctive contribution to 
both the study of opposition parties and the literature on emerging democracies and the process 
of consolidation. 
Preliminary Definitions 
This research project is concerned with the activities of opposition parties in new 
democracies (OPNDs). Each of these terms requires careful elaboration. As is typical in the 




nebulous and frequently contested. The following discussions of each key term highlight 
important understandings of each concept, as well as the working definitions that will be utilized 
for this project. Additionally, I take the time here to define each of the key phenomena of 
interest—electoral boycotts, parliamentary boycotts, and party-sponsored protests.  
Opposition 
Parry (1997) begins a long discussion of the key, largely unanswered questions facing the 
study of opposition by stating that the idea of opposition itself is a contested matter. For the most 
part, the task of making this distinction has largely fallen onto the individual researcher. Part of 
the definitional difficulty comes from the fact that opposition is a relational concept—“the 
character of the opposition is tied to the character of the government” (Blondel 1997, 463). As a 
result, opposition has historically been considered typologically, with scholars looking at 
families of governments and oppositions in order to determine what the opposition is (Dahl 
1966; Blondel 1997). Sometimes, opposition has even been left undefined, with the reader to 
assume that the scholar is simply referring to something other than the government itself.  
There are two questions that determine a definition of opposition. First, what is the 
opposition against? In other words, to what does the opposition present an alternative? Second, 
and more specifically, to what extent does an opposition have to be institutionalized? Does the 
researcher consider various forms of contentious politics—dissent, protest groups—to be 
opposition? Although my project looks at specific types of oppositions (political parties), my 
general definition of opposition is broader and does not depend upon institutionalization. Many 
scholars who study oppositions would agree—Blondel argues that scholars should expand 
beyond the liberal democratic context and include in the term “opposition” those activities that 
are not undertaken by political parties, or in the governmental context (1997, 465). Kolinsky 




much of the contemporary work on political oppositions is done within the context of this 
literature, as a whole. On the other hand, others argue that opposition is a term that should be 
used only in the strictest sense. Ionescu and de Madariaga argue:  
Political opposition, in the sense in which is it is used here to distinguish it from 
political conflict, is the most advanced and institutionalized form of political 
conflict. Hence the term should be used of situations where an opposition is not 
merely allowed to function, but is actually entrusted with a function (1968, 9). 
For the purpose of this project, opposition takes the more malleable definition embraced by 
recent scholars (although it is further qualified later in this discussion). We will consider 
oppositions to be organized groups that advocate or champion alternate forms of government 
design, different approaches to governance, or different political policies than the current 
government, and work (parliamentarily or extra-parliamentarily) to incorporate their ideas into 
government policy.  
Party 
 Like “opposition,” “party” is a term that people immediately understand, though often 
struggle to describe definitively. In their role as mediating institutions between the government 
and the governed, political parties are given different definitional attributes by different authors. 
In 1957, Downs defined a political party as “a team of men (sic) seeking to control the governing 
apparatus by gaining office in a duly constituted election. By team we mean a coalition whose 
members agree on all their goals instead of on just part of them” (25). Alternatively, Aldrich 
proposes that “a political party is an institutionalized coalition, one that has adopted rules, norms, 
and procedures” (1995, 19). White (2006) lists no fewer than eight competing definitions of 
political party, some of which highlight beliefs, ideology, policy preferences, or the mere pursuit 




 Most definitions of political party contain, at a minimum, the fact that political parties 
produce candidates to seek office and influence within the government. A notable exception is 
V.O. Key, who also references the importance of extra-governmental political groups, which he 
believes fall under the umbrella description of political party (1942). In new democracies, it is 
more difficult to adhere to the minimal definition of party, as there are many instances of what 
we would otherwise call political parties refusing to participate in the electoral game, preferring, 
instead, to use extra-governmental means of pursuing their interests. 
 As a result, my working definition for political party is also broad, in order to allow for 
these groups which are important to the theory at work and the phenomenon of interest we wish 
to uncover. In terms of this undertaking, a political party is an organizing structure for 
individuals in pursuit of similar policy, ideological goals, or political power used to coordinate 
in order gain an influence on government.  
Democracy 
 Two main schools exist when it comes to the task of defining democracy: those who 
believe a procedural distinction is adequate to understand what is and is not a democracy, and 
those who believe democracy requires not only fair elections but also some guarantees of 
freedoms and rights (substantive definition). There remains much contention over which type of 
definition is preferable, which is exacerbated by the dramatically different ways scholars 
operationalize democracy in each vein. Those who follow the procedural definition view the 
concept dichotomously—a country either meets the institutional requirements of democracy, or it 
does not. On the other hand, substantive measures of democracy employ indices that measure 
normative components of democracy alongside institutional ones. As a result, democracy is 




democratic. This project looks at countries which are labeled democracies—however, a few of 
the potential variables of interest are components of substantive definitions of democracy, which 
introduces some danger in employing that type of definition. Therefore, in order to avoid 
confounding problems in my theory and analysis, I avoid the definitions that incorporate these 
ideas into the concept. Like the broad definitions of “opposition” and “party” reported above, the 
procedural definition of democracy provides a minimum level of democracy helpful to the 
development of this research project.  
 Specifically, in this project, I consider a country to be a democracy if it follows the 
definitions and distinctions in the Democracy and Dictatorship (DD) dataset. In it, democracies 
“are regimes in which governmental offices are filled as a consequence of contested elections” 
(Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010, 69). Here, we see the two main prerequisites for 
democracy—that the leaders are elected representatives of the people, and that they are elected in 
substantially free and fair contests where non-governmental parties have some chance of winning 
office in these contests. More specifically, contestation is composed of three features—that the 
outcome of the election is not known in advance, that the winner of the election is able to take 
office, and that elections that meet the first two criteria take place at regular intervals (ibid.). 
Extending from this discussion are four explicit requirements for a country to be classified as a 
democracy: 
1. The chief executive must be chosen by popular election or by a body that was itself 
popularly elected.  
2. The legislature must be popularly elected. 
3. There must be more than one party competing in the elections. 
4. An alternation in power under electoral rules identical to the ones that brought the 
incumbent to power must have taken place. (ibid.). 
This definition is particularly interesting in that it illustrates the importance of the 




hold the presence of a viable opposition as a quality inherent in democracy. This harkens back to 
modern democratic theory’s postulate that oppositions are key to determining the extent and 
quality of democratic governance (Dahl 1966; Przeworski 2015; Stepan 1997).  
Electoral and Legislative Boycotts 
A boycott, in general, is a choice an actor makes to refrain from taking an action. In 
politics, we observe a variety of boycott activities; this dissertation focuses on two of them—
electoral and legislative boycotts, undertaken by political parties. Electoral boycotts occur when 
a political party chooses not to contest an election by not putting any affiliated candidates on the 
ballot. Electoral boycotts can be the strategy of a single party, a party alliance, or the entire 
political opposition1. Each of these instances will count as an electoral boycott in this 
dissertation.  
My treatment of legislative boycotts, on the other hand, must be more regimented. While 
the nuances will be discussed further in Chapter 3, I count a legislative boycott as the choice of a 
political party to remove itself from legislative procedure in a gesture of protest. This requires 
the coordination by party leaders, and the participation of all representatives affiliated with that 
party. If a single representative, or small group, removes themselves from legislature, then it will 
not count as a legislative boycott. During a legislative boycott, the political party will not attend 
sessions or otherwise participate in the legislative process. 
Contributions, Conclusions, and Implications 
While it is universally believed that opposition parties play an important role in fostering 
the development of democracy, remarkably little is understood about the way specific opposition 
                                                          
1 Lindberg (2004) categorizes these as “partial” and “total” boycotts, respectively. Beaulieu (2006), on the other 
hand, classifies boycotts involving only some opposition parties as “minor” boycotts, and those involving all 




goals and tactics—the functional role of oppositions—can affect the path of democratization. 
This is a gap in the literature that I seek to fill with my dissertation. Despite an empirical 
understanding that opposition parties in new democracies have formed and are forming in 
manners and environments that are sometimes dramatically different than their counterparts in 
Western Europe, the Western model of opposition remains the normalized ideal and the 
consensus is that extra-parliamentary activity on the part of opposition parties erodes democracy.  
This project is meant to challenge this consensus. In this chapter, I provided the 
background necessary to understand the role of the opposition in democratic theory. I described 
the genesis of the opposition in Western democracy, and how political philosophers moved from 
considering competing parties to be a detriment to governance to valuing the effects of the 
interactions between government and a loyal opposition (Hoftstadter 1969; Ionescu and de 
Madariaga 1968). By understanding the history of the opposition party, we can begin to better 
understand why the normalized ideal of the Western model of opposition was able to take such 
strong roots in political philosophy and, in turn, come to influence the field’s normative 
considerations of what makes democracy work.  
This area has been relatively unexplored in the fields of comparative politics, democratic 
consolidation, or party politics. Naturally, this leaves a lot of area to explore and allows me to 
contribute to the expansion of the literature on the functional role of opposition parties as 
compared to the challenger role of opposition parties, the latter of which has been studied much 
more rigorously in this subfield. Beyond building on the consideration of the functional role of 
opposition parties, my study will also increase our understanding of long-term effects of 
opposition goal selection, tactic choices, and the consequences these hold for the development of 




If my research supports my challenge to the assumption that extra-parliamentary tactics 
have negative repercussions on democracy, there are many implications for our understanding of 
democratization and how we use that understanding to influence international policy-making. 
First, acceptance of this theory could further work to break the often implicit habit social 
scientists have of relying on the Western democratic experience as the “ideal” path to 
establishing and consolidating democracy. If it is shown that a deviation from the Westminster or 
other Western opposition models is not fundamentally detrimental to the development of 
democracy, as commonly hypothesized, scholars could also come to terms with this in other 
areas of democratization studies. This study could also have implications for the way policy-
makers treat those countries developing democratic governance—for example, as members in 
intergovernmental organizations, particularly those entering the European Union. If the path to 
good governance for those countries that experience opposition boycotts is comparable to those 
who do not, as is shown by the mixed results in my qualitative analysis and null results in my 
statistical analysis, then Western policy-makers evaluating a country’s trajectory can decrease 
criticism and sanctions against those countries that do not follow the Western ideal and instead 
may choose to provide different forms of development assistance.  
Outline of Chapters 
In the next chapter, I will present my theoretical frame in the context of a review of the 
literature. This review incorporates both the nascent literature on boycotts and opposition 
actions, as well as relevant dimensions of the much-larger democratic transitions literature. I 
begin with a discussion of types of goals sought by opposition parties and the tactics that they 
use to pursue these goals. Here, I compare and contrast the goals and tactics used by parties in 




on opposition parties and extra-parliamentary tactics, discussing what we know about legislative 
and electoral boycotts and their repercussions. I illustrate how, despite widely accepted 
assumptions, there are circumstances in which boycotts can be seen as a strong political signal 
and circumvent issues in the development of democratic institutions caused by poor 
opportunities for communication within institutions. This effort was begun by Beaulieu who, in 
her own dissertation, conducted the first analysis of the long-term effects of electoral boycotts 
(2006). The signals of both electoral and legislative boycotts can create a new path for increases 
in democratic governance that would otherwise have been prevented or, at the very least, prevent 
the occurrence of a boycott from contributing only detrimental effects. I finish by identifying a 
few scope conditions under which boycotts may fail to have the expected negative effects, or 
even have a positive effect upon the long-term development of democratic governance; these 
scope conditions are targeted protests, frequency, and international interest. I finish by discussing 
why the most likely outcome of my large-N investigation is the statistical null, while the nuances 
of my case studies indicate that a variety of political and historical variables interact to determine 
the effectiveness of extra-parliamentary tactics. 
Chapter Three will be devoted to three case studies. The first exemplifies how legislative 
boycotts can have a positive effect upon democratic development; the second does the same for 
electoral boycotts. The third shows how, when my scope conditions are not satisfied, boycotts 
can have negative consequences for the development of democracy. I employ these case studies 
for several reasons: First, by focusing on specific cases I can draw more meaningful connections 
between the goals expressed by the opposition, their choice to boycott, and the consequences of 
that boycott. Second, case studies are useful tool to identify key variables that may have 




highlight potential causal variables. Finally, focusing on specific cases will allow me to more 
accurately trace causal patterns from the establishment of political goals through the choice to 
boycott and to the outcomes this choice has on democratic governance (George and Bennett 
2005). 
Chapter Four will describe my data-generating process, followed by an analysis of the 
descriptive statistics. In discussing this process, I highlight the unique challenges of constructing 
a dataset using convenience samples and text analysis. My data on legislative and electoral 
boycotts are event data, generated in part by the Cline Center for Advanced Social Science 
Research’s Global News Archive. After discussing the data generation process involved in 
constructing the new data on boycotts, I will describe the dependent and control variables 
included in my dataset. The chapter concludes with a review of the descriptive statistics 
surrounding legislative and electoral boycotts and related variables. 
Chapters Five and Six will present my statistical analysis. The first of these chapters will 
focus on legislative boycotts and their effects on rule of law, accountability, and corruption. The 
following chapter then turns to electoral boycotts in an attempt to increase our understanding of 
their consequences by observing the long-term effects of the opposition’s choice to refrain from 
electoral competition. Chapter 6 expands upon Beaulieu’s 2006 study by 1) extending the 
analysis to 2016, and 2) moving beyond the conceptualization of democratic change as a change 
in laws to democratic change as a change in expert measures of key components of democratic 
rule. Validation of my theory will depend on whether my analysis disproves the null hypothesis, 
that extra-parliamentary actions by the opposition in new democracies is correlated with lower 
scores on good governance indicators. I will also test three additional hypotheses in each chapter. 




participate in legislative boycotts, the country will experience a lower level of rule of law and 
accountability and higher levels of corruption. The counterpart theory in Chapter Six will test the 
same hypotheses with electoral boycotts in the role of explanatory variable. I will test these 
hypotheses using dynamic panel data analysis of the country-year datasets. Dynamic panel data 
analysis is an ideal tool for this study because it will show patterns both within and across 
country clusters with lagged dependent variables, as well as an analysis of how well the model 
works over all.  
The main finding of this project—that there is no statistical evidence supporting the 
common perspective that boycotts are detrimental to the development of democracy—as well as 
its implications, will be discussed in the concluding chapter. I will reflect on those aspects of my 
qualitative and quantitative analyses that support or challenge the theory presented in Chapter 2. 
I will also discuss the wider implications of the findings generated by my research. Finally, I will 
discuss some additional avenues of inquiry that could build upon our understanding of what we 
should expect in terms of political development after opposition parties choose to pursue extra-













Chapter 2: Debating the Common Perspective on Boycotts 
 
The first chapter provided background on the rise of oppositions and on the existing 
consensus on how an effective opposition functions in democracies. This chapter will begin with 
a brief, general discussion of goals and tactics of opposition parties in new democracies. Then, I 
focus the current state of the literature on opposition parties and extra-parliamentary tactics. Like 
the study of opposition parties in new democracies in general, the literature on their choices to 
pursue extra-parliamentary tactics and the effects of these tactics in a fledgling state. Much of it 
focuses on specific case or region studies and is typically interested in the immediate outcomes 
of opposition party extra-parliamentary tactics (Beaulieu 2006). More frequently, discussion of 
opposition parties’ choices to pursue extra-parliamentary tactics are only briefly discussed in 
accounts of governance in new democracies and brushed aside as a symptom of poor democratic 
development (e.g. Moniruzzaman 2009). Despite the lacuna in the existing research, however, it 
nevertheless presents a wealth of background information.  
After discussing why the literature overwhelmingly seems to accept that boycotts, as 
extra-parliamentary tactics, are bad for democracy, I lay out why this point-of-view is too 
simplistic to accurately capture the nuances of the effects of such tactics. In doing so, I also 
describe some circumstances under which we can expect to see that an opposition’s extra-
parliamentary actions may prove not to be detrimental to the development of democracy or, in 
some cases, may even help.   
As hinted at in the first chapter, political parties, generally, are formed by a group of 
people who seek some outcome currently unavailable to them in the existing party system. 
Where oppositions in Western democracies arise to propose alternative policies and eventually 




Scholars frequently characterize them as seeking to represent specific interests of certain (often 
under-represented) groups in parliament or seeking to gain political power for specific 
individuals (Dahl 1973; Webb and White 2007). We also frequently see opposition parties trying 
to evoke institutional or constitutional change, as well as proposing or opposing policy (Abedi 
2004; Dahl 1996; Dahl 1973; Ierceri 1992; Ignazi 1996; Webb and White 2007). Table 3, below, 
provides a non-exhaustive list of opposition party goals. 
Table 2.1: Opposition Parties: Goals and Tactics 
Goals of New Opposition Parties  Tactics of New Opposition Parties2 
1. To gain control of government. 
2. To monitor the government party. 
3. Institutional or constitutional change. 
4. To gain political office 
5. To propose new policy. 
6. To change existing policy. 
7. To represent the interests of a particular 
group. 
1. Electoral competition. 
2. Abstaining from electoral competition. 
3. Boycotting parliament. 
4. Criticizing the government party in 
media. 
5. Criticizing government policy in media. 
6. Proposing alterative policy. 
7. Voting with the government. 
8. Voting against the government. 
9. Participating in protests. 
10. Calling for protests. 
11. Setting up a shadow government. 
 
Tactics, on the other hand, are the actions that opposition parties pursue in order to 
achieve these goals. Many times, these tactics depend upon where opposition parties operate in 
the regime. In industrialized democracies, opposition parties risk being considered illegitimate or 
irrelevant if their primary functions lie outside of government institutions. As a result, these 
tactics are rarely on the list of viable options for oppositions in these states. In new democracies, 
however, there are many more paths available to opposition parties—these options are listed in 
the second column of Table 3, above. Opposition parties can choose to follow the norm and act 
like those in Westminster democracies, biding their time and garnering support until the next 
                                                          




election. Alternatively, they can act more like US and German oppositions3 and challenge the 
policies of the government and propose alternative laws (Helms 2004). They can also hold office 
and act within parliament but maintain an extra-parliamentary front to oppose government from 
the outside. These tactics are available to all opposition parties, regardless of location. 
Opposition parties in new democracies are less restricted by institutional norms limiting extra-
parliamentary action, as in established democracies, so they are more likely to choose less 
normatively “ideal” methods of influencing government. 
Extra-Parliamentary Tactics of Opposition Parties 
 Before I delve further into the small literature on opposition parties and extra-
parliamentary tactics, it is prudent to address a related question: Why are the extra-parliamentary 
tactics of opposition parties an interesting phenomenon? In other words, why do I expect these 
actions, in particular, to have a meaningful effect on the development of democracy in recently 
transitioned countries? In short, as this section will illustrate, the literature on oppositions and 
extra-parliamentary activity is often highly critical of such actions. In fact, there is a portion of 
the democratization literature that considers mass protests in new democracies a sign that 
democracy is eroding. It makes sense that, by extension, they would consider oppositions 
working outside of their designated spaces and in such unconventional methods another, perhaps 
even stronger, indicator that democracy may be beginning to fail. After all, how can we expect 
the system to work if even the political elites have to move outside of it in order to get things 
done? However, this assumption that oppositions moving some of their methods outside of 
parliament is indicative of a failure in the adoption of democracy actually overlooks a few 
important characteristics that could help the development of democratic rule, in the long run.  
                                                          




 In this study, I narrow down the broad category of extra-parliamentary tactics to two 
types of tactics: electoral boycotts and legislative boycotts. While electoral boycotts have 
frequently been studied before (Beaulieu 2010; Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Frankel 2010; Kelley 
2011; Lindberg 2004; Smith 2013; Posusney 2002), legislative boycotts have not received the 
same attention. Accounts of the consequences of legislative boycotts are mostly limited to 
historical analyses or case studies (Lal 1993), with the exception of Spary (2013), who includes 
it in her analysis of legislative protest in democracies. This section of the chapter has two goals: 
first, to reiterate the definition of legislative and electoral boycotts from the first chapter and then 
indicate the characteristics that allow us to identify their occurrence. Second, this section serves 
as a review of the literature on electoral and legislative boycotts and their consequences. The 
introductory chapter provided a basic definition of electoral and legislative boycotts. As a 
reminder, I generally defined boycotts as “a choice an actor makes to refrain from taking an 
action.” In the case of electoral boycotts, it is the decision not to contest an election; in the case 
of legislative boycotts, it is the decision of a party to remove itself from the legislative process. 
 Legislative Boycotts 
 Legislative boycotts are an act of legislative protest; other examples include sit-ins, 
walkouts, and collective disobedience within the chamber (Spary 2013). In the first chapter, I 
defined legislative boycotts as the choice of a political party to remove itself from legislative 
procedure. This requires coordination by party leaders, and the participation of all 
representatives affiliated with that party. Legislative boycotts can be small or large-scale, with 
one or more parties joining in on the boycott.  
 An important quality of the legislative boycott that should not be ignored is its ability to 
be employed as a substitute for its cousin, the electoral boycott. Boycotting an election means 




position to take part in any institutionalized policy or constitutional remedy. If an opposition 
party elects to participate in a legislative boycott, however, the party has the freedom to abstain 
for any period of time and not, by necessity, for an entire election cycle. The legislative boycott 
affords the opposition party with more discretion on when it can come back to the table and 
negotiate with the government. This question of when the opposition will return and the often 
detrimental effects an opposition walk-out has on the legislature’s functionality can help instigate 
concessions or start negotiations with the government. This also helps to explain why legislative 
boycotts occur more frequently—they are less costly signals than opposition boycotts. The 
choice between the electoral and legislative boycott is evident in several cases, particularly that 
of the Fijian Labour Party (FLP) in the May 1992 election. The Indo-Fijian community was at 
odds with the dominant ethnic-Fijian community, particularly considering the new constitution, 
which they called “racist, authoritarian, undemocratic, and feudalistic” (Lal 1993, 286). The 
FLP’s coalition partner, the National Federation Party (NFP), also considered boycotting the 
election but abandoned this plan in July 1991. The NFP had decided that international pressure 
would not be enough to force the government to reconsider negotiations over the constitution and 
the boycott wasn’t popular enough among Indo-Fijians to be a powerful enough signal to the 
government, and thus that their only recourse was to work for change from within the legislature. 
Party leader Jai Ram Reddy asserted that agreeing to participate in elections was not acceptance 
of the constitution as it stood, but a way to get to where the party’s efforts had a chance of 
bringing about a change. The NFP took longer to come to the same conclusion but, when it did 
declare its intention to contest the election in April 1992, party leadership described the 
movement from electoral boycott to (intended) parliamentary boycott in merely a change in party 





 Like legislative boycotts, electoral boycotts are an example of protest but within the 
electoral arena. Unlike legislative boycotts, electoral boycotts are one of the only examples of 
such protest in this arena that is within the realm of the political elite rather than that of civil 
society. In the first chapter, I defined electoral boycotts as an instance when a political party 
chooses not to contest an election by not putting any affiliated candidates on the ballot. Like 
legislative boycotts, electoral boycotts can involve one or more political parties, and this 
dissertation will consider all such instances as electoral boycotts. Some scholars, such as 
Lindburg (2004) and Beaulieu (2006), consider the nuances between full/major or partial/minor 
boycotts, distinguished by the number of parties that participate in the boycott; this study does 
not, forgoing an in-depth analysis of electoral boycotts in favor of the overall study of boycotts 
as an opposition tactic.  
What is “good governance”? 
 Good governance stands as the outcome under investigation in this dissertation. But what 
is good governance, and how we do know if a country has it? The literature on governance is 
mixed on what, exactly, good governance means, as well as how to measure it from state to state. 
This has been true since governance, as a concept, began to rise in popularity in the democracy 
and development literature during the 1980s. In describing these earlier times de Alcantara says 
that “’governance’…is being used by groups of very different ideological persuasion, for a 
number of different and often contradictory ends” (2008, 106). In one attempt to clarify the 
concept, Rothstein and Teorell (2008) describe four popular and competing notions of what good 
governance is—impartial institutions, democracy, rule of law, and efficiency/effectiveness4. In 
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short, each of these notions is an attempt to conceptualize how well government works. Agnafors 
argues that definitions of good governance need to be more complex than a list of desirable 
qualities, but also include a variety of complex values and “moral content” (2013, 437). Faced 
with such a debate on what makes “good governance”, it is sometimes easier to identify what 
bad governance is. Diamond defines bad governance and “governance that is drenched in 
corruption, patronage, favoritism, and abuse of power” (2007, 119). In studying governance and 
ascribing a qualifier of “good” or “bad”, therefore, many measures look to observe phenomena 
that challenge good governance and discern the magnitude of their negative attributes.  
 These popular definitions and their corresponding measures of good governance are the 
subject of much debate in the literature, revolving around how well such measures can capture 
the complicated nature of “good governance” and how valid or reliable such data is in statistical 
analysis. The task of measuring phenomena such as political stability, government effectiveness 
or regulatory quality—such as Kaufmann et. al. (2010) do in the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI)—relies on the perceptions of experts on individual governments. As such, 
these measures are criticized for lacking objectivity and promoting deterministic idea of 
governance, based on Western perspectives (Holmberg et. al. 2009). Langbein and Knack 
(2010), for example, state that the WGI’s six indicators do not actually measure six aspect but 
seem to be giving only subtly different measures of one concept. Erkkila and Piironen provide a 
more general concern: that, by calculating complicated measures of good governance, social 
scientists effectively depoliticize governance and transform these issues into phenomena that can 
only be understood by those with expert knowledge (2014, 356).  
 Despite the problems that come from defining good governance as the extent to which a 




measures such as the WGI, this dissertation still utilizes both. The debate over defining good 
governance, while theoretically interesting, is not directly important for the way I utilize the 
concept in this study. I am interested not in the overarching concept of good governance but in 
specific achievements in rule of law, control of corruption, and accountability that can credibly 
lead to increases in good governance and democratic development. Secondly, despite this 
criticism, the WGI is one of the most widely-used measures of good governance and its 
components; employing these measures will allow my dissertation to speak more directly to 
those studies that have come before.  
Theory 
 First, let’s take a step back and return to the question of why boycotts, in general, are 
interesting to those of us who study the development of democratic rule. Kelley describes 
boycotts as a “political decision” undertaken by political parties and political factions (2011, 
1528). This framework is particularly useful as it emphasizes both the party’s role as a rational 
actor and the fact that removing one’s party from politics is, in fact, making a political statement 
and sending a signal to the government. Boycotts are dramatic means of sending signals. By 
removing themselves from the electoral contest, parties lose access to the rewards of government 
and the ability to influence policy. Removing themselves, even temporarily, from the legislature 
can also prevent the opposition party from promoting its own goals or blocking legislation that it 
finds in conflict with its goals. Boycotts are costly, as a result; as such, the opposition has many 
incentives to avoid them. Therefore, when oppositions choose to boycott, they are making the 
tactical choice to send a strong message to the government and to their supporters. 
Second, let us return to and evaluate the assumption that oppositional employment of 




normative guidelines to support this claim, such as Moehler and Lindberg’s (2009) discussion of 
how democratic consolidation requires political parties that have a “shared appreciation” of the 
state’s institutional legitimacy, including that of the electoral process (1448-1449). By 
boycotting elections, parties cast doubt on the legitimacy of the political process, which can stall 
or prevent democratic consolidation. To Pastor (1999), this effect was so great that he considered 
an election boycotted to be an election failed. The possible delegitimization of the political 
sphere by the political elite can be taken as an indication that the democratic form of governance 
is not working. To be sustained, democracy requires an institutional legitimacy in a way that a 
previous autocratic government did not. While boycotts can be useful tools in electoral 
autocracies, Moehler and Lindberg (2006) postulate that the inception of democratic rule means 
that that these tactics must be abandoned, for fear of undermining democracy and the people’s 
faith in the process. 
Other works by Lindberg continue this discussion, employing empirical analyses of 
boycotts and their effects on democracy. Lindberg (2006a), as well as Kelly (2001), argue that 
electoral boycotts negatively affect democracy by lessening the quality of elections and limiting 
the people’s choice of representatives. Opposition party participation works to legitimize and 
eventually help to institutionalize democratic elections. Lindberg (2004) explains how removing 
potential representatives can adversely affect the development of democracy: 
“It seems to follow from the very nature of the elections that increased participation of  
opposition parties and candidates would lead to higher levels of popular participation by  
inducing choice and competition, resulting in more frequent alternations in power.” (13) 
Recall the requirements of democracy provided by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 




democracy. If we focus on the procedural definition of democracy, states that fall short of the 
alternation requirement cannot be considered democratic. Of course, we are primarily looking at 
states that have experienced alternations5, and because of that we are not too concerned with this 
effect on the establishment of democracy. Still, it poses the question as to whether the 
consolidation of democracy can continue if one of its components falls short. If opposition 
parties refuse to take part in elections, scholars reason, then the people are being deprived of the 
full stratum of representation that they deserve. There are groups in society with specific needs 
and interests that will effectively be silenced if the parties that serve these interests abstain from 
electoral competition.  
 However, some of this concern may be overstated, since it is rare that viable opposition 
parties would refuse to participate in elections for an amount of time that would cause 
considerable setbacks for democratic development, which likely explains why those studies that 
determine that boycotts negatively affect democracy all look at short-term effects. Once again, as 
Kelley (2011) explains, boycotts are costly choices for political parties. If a party chooses to 
boycott an election, they decide to have no political representation in the legislature until the next 
electoral cycle. The Jordanian opposition parties, for example, chose to hold a total boycott of 
the 1997 elections as a protest against electoral laws that curtailed the opposition, specifically the 
move from a block vote system to a one-person one-vote system (Ryan 2011). The opposition’s 
choice to boycott the election created a parliament which was almost exclusively made up of 
monarchy loyalists and conservative-leaning tribal leaders until the next elections in 2003—a 
costly choice, indeed. Sparked by such examples, Frankel posits that electoral boycotts are costly 
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signals and recommends that threats of boycotts should not be followed through, because they 
have “disastrous consequences” for the political party and often only succeed in further 
entrenching the government (2010, 1). Regarding legislative boycotts, if a party chooses to 
boycott parliament, they resign themselves to not influencing the development of legislation and 
policy. They also potentially deny themselves the ability to vote against legislation that could 
hurt them or their constituents. Such a decision has a chance of damaging the party’s political 
future. Parties thus have an incentive to avoid making the costly decision to boycott elections or 
the legislature. Recall our emphasis on Kelley’s description of boycotts as “political decisions” 
and how it emphasizes the party as a rational actor (ibid.) Parties must weigh the costs and 
benefits of boycotting in their systems, and the discussion above emphasizes just how high these 
costs may be. Therefore, it’s not expected that parties will make the decision to boycott lightly.  
 To reiterate, those who believe that extra-parliamentary tactics, such as electoral or 
legislative boycotts, are bad for democracy believe so for four reasons: First, that boycotts lessen 
the quality of elections by leaving portions of the population without representation in 
government (Beaulieu 2006; Kelley 2011; Lindberg 2004). Second, that by removing viable 
parties from electoral competitions, boycotts reduce the occurrence of alternations in power. 
Third, boycotts signal a lack of appreciation for institutional legitimacy and may undermine the 
public’s confidence in the democratic process. Finally, legislative boycotts, as 
“nonconventional”, “disorderly” and “disruptive” forms of opposition can also limit 
representation and deliberation in democracies, affecting accountability and governance (Spary 
2013). Beyond that, they can lead to a “paralysis” of the legislative body, where the emerging 
democratic institution can fail to become the center of legislation and governance 




opposition is a symptom of low-quality democracy primarily because it damages vital links 
between the population, the political class, and government. These postulations, however, are 
relatively untested in large-N statistical analyses, or in the long-run. In fact, there are several 
scope conditions in which these consequences could be ameliorated or that benefits could arise in 
the long-run; as a result, I posit that those who describe boycotts as detrimental to democracy are 
failing to look at the whole picture, which presents much more variety in the outcomes of these 
extra-parliamentary tactics.  
 In evaluating extra-parliamentary tactics is important to remember that scholars have 
long recognized the existence of non-party and extra-parliamentary paths of opposition: for 
example, Blondel (1997) and Kolinsky (1987) include them their respective typologies of 
oppositions since they often encompass voices and demands that would otherwise be left 
unheard by government. I argue that the movement outside of parliamentary institutions does not 
necessarily silence voices, as the above scholars have argued, but can in fact make some voices 
more easily heard. The democratization literature is full of examples of how mass protests lead to 
the opening of authoritarian rule and the transition to democracy by allowing society to signify 
its expectations of government (Bunce 2003; Geddes 1999; Mainwaring, O’Donnell and 
Valenzuela 1992; Teorell 2010). The mere establishment of procedural democracy cannot be 
expected to immediately clarify communication paths between outside groups and the 
government—in fact, those new democracies that are not well-institutionalized may experience 
representational challenges akin to those in autocracies. I argue that extra-parliamentary actions 
can help produce more democratic outcomes over the long-run, improving representation and 
accountability by clarifying the positions of the opposition and allowing them to air their 




be dependent on certain conditions. Where the widely-accepted theory argues that extra-
parliamentary actions damage democracy by removing some perspectives from government, I 
argue that these consequences are situational and that extra-parliamentary action can also act as a 
corrective by establishing new paths of communication between the people, the opposition, and 
the government. 
 Beaulieu’s unpublished 2006 dissertation can be considered a precursor to the analysis 
undertaken in this dissertation. In her study, Beaulieu sought to answer two questions, (1) why 
do parties boycott elections and (2) how do electoral boycotts effect democracy in developing 
countries. In answering the second question, Beaulieu provides the first study of the long-term 
effects of electoral boycotts. While her first subject of inquiry is beyond the scope of this 
analysis, I build upon the second point by extending the study beyond her universe of 66 
electoral boycott cases between 1990 and 2002 to 78 electoral boycotts and 181 legislative 
boycotts between 1961 and 2016. Where Beaulieu seeks to distinguish between major and minor 
boycotts—designations primarily based upon the number of political parties that participate in 
the boycott—my distinction is between boycotts by parties seeking access to the legislature and 
those that already play a role in governance. Finally, in considering effectiveness of boycotts, 
Beaulieu uses changes in law or better adherence to existing laws, measured dichotomously, as a 
proxy for democratic improvements. I take a more direct approach and employ measures of 
quality of governance as a continuous variable to account for changes in democracy. In short, 
Beaulieu’s efforts are largely dedicated to the why of boycotts, while my study primarily focuses 
on the long-term effects of boycotts as an example of the role played by extra-parliamentary 




Although I consider both legislative and electoral boycotts and Beaulieu (2006) focuses 
only on electoral boycotts, she makes an argument about the processes through which electoral 
boycotts can improve democratic governance similar to the one I propose above. In her 
dissertation, Beaulieu analyzes the relationship between major electoral boycotts6 and political 
reform (as related to accountability). She argues that major electoral boycotts can cause an 
increase in democratic quality by motivating the incumbent to 1) change the law, and/or 2) better 
adhere to existing laws (ibid., 122); I posit that extra-parliamentary actions also allow 
oppositions the opportunity to transmit a clearer signal of policies they desire and the lengths to 
which they would go to see them instituted. Beaulieu also makes the important point that I have 
repeated here—those who argue that electoral boycotts are the “death toll” of democracy do so 
because they focus on the short-term repercussions, i.e. the representational void discussed 
above. She shows that there is a significant relationship between major electoral boycotts and 
instances of reform following elections, with reforms seven times more likely to follow a 
boycotted election than one without a boycott (ibid., 129). 
Beyond Beaulieu’s study, little has been done to test either perspective on how extra-
parliamentary actions affect democracy. Most attempts take the same case-centric course as 
Baxter (1996) or Lal 1993). Baxter provides a historical account of Bangladeshi politics between 
1990 and 1996, chronicling the relationship between government and opposition. He shows how 
policy disagreements between the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), the governing party, and 
the opposition (mostly spearheaded by the Awami League) resulted in parliamentary boycotts, 
leading to the mass resignation of opposition members in December 1994 and the almost total 
                                                          
6 Beaulieu defines a major boycott as one which involves a majority of the opposition. This is juxtaposed by minor 
election boycotts, which comprise of a few small parties and fall short of the majority of the opposition. She is not 




boycott of parliamentary elections in February 1995. The latter primarily discusses the lead-up to 
the first democratic elections in Fiji following the 1987 coups. Of particular interest is his 
account of the dissolution of the National Federation Party-Fiji Labor Party coalition in 1992, a 
consequence, in part, of disagreement over the question of whether or not to boycott the May 
1992 election. The vast majority of the literature, on the other hand, focuses on determining 
under which circumstances parties will pursue extra-parliamentary actions, particularly 
boycotts—while an important question, this portion of the literature glosses over the effects of 
such actions. In-depth treatment of boycotts is rare; Lindberg (2004; 2006), Beaulieu (2006), and 
Beaulieu and Hyde (2005) are the exceptions, and they focus only on electoral boycotts. Only the 
latter two are, then, interested in the consequences of these boycotts. I am the first to consider the 
effects of both boycott types of extra-parliamentary opposition tactics upon democracy.  
Scope and Conditions 
 Having established justification for my proposal that extra-parliamentary actions can 
improve democratic outcomes in new democracies, I now move to discussing under what 
conditions this can be true. In other words, this section identifies the scope conditions, or 
parameters under which my theory applies, clarifying under what circumstances null or positive 
outcomes can follow legislative and electoral boycotts. While these scope conditions were 
identified drawing on the existing literature on boycotts, it is also heavily influenced by the 
literature on democratic transitions.  I have identified the following necessary conditions under 
which the opposition’s choice to pursue extra-parliamentary tactics will not have negative 
repercussions on democratic development, exemplified by measures of good governance. First, 
the boycotts must be targeted to specific goals, which are clearly expressed and easily identified 




electoral boycotts cannot be held too frequently. Finally, legislative and electoral boycotts are 
more likely to be successful and thus more likely to help democratic development when there is 
linkage and leverage with outside democratic actors.  
 The importance of a targeted boycott, in my opinion, cannot be understated. The theory 
described in this chapter relies upon power the boycott has as a signal to government. Signals 
can successfully lead to the achievement of a goal—say, for example, the adoption of a second 
official language within a country with a fierce ethnic divide—only if they are clearly stated and 
the goal is communicated effectively and efficiently. Boycotts can work to increase democracy 
by bringing attention to issues that the government may not be prioritizing; it is difficult to begin 
to prioritize an issue if one is uncertain about what the problem actually is. Boycotts that are 
undertaken with vague (or sometimes, no) goals are not likely to be successful in stimulating 
change from the government, increasing or maintaining confidence in democratic institutions, or 
contributing to good governance. The lack of clear, defined goals circumvents the effective use 
of the boycott as a signal by opposition parties (Satell and Popopic 2017). This, in turn, further 
muddies the waters in government-opposition relations, perhaps at the cost of democracy itself.  
 While there are no studies focusing on the effectiveness of targeted versus untargeted 
boycotts, the literature on framing, collective action, and its effectiveness can logically be 
extrapolated to guide expectations for this specific situation, especially since boycotts are a form 
of protest (Spary 2013). Framing is a key idea in the public opinion literature and has 
increasingly been brought into the protest literature; Chong and Druckman define framing as 
“the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their 
thinking about an issue” (2007, 104). Frames are used by political parties, leaders, political 




goals they pursue; for example, we often see political leaders use framing to connect favored 
policy goals with commonly held values, such as democratic ideals or religious beliefs (Chong 
and Druckman 2007). 
 In a review of framing processes and social movements, Bendford and Snow state that 
frames and the framing process are central to the understanding of social movements (2000). In 
an earlier article, they state that social movement actors have the power to create the meaning 
behind the movements and portray it to all those involved, whether they are supportive or 
antagonistic towards the movement (Snow and Benford 1998). As the initiating actors in a 
parliamentary of legislative boycott, opposition party leaders are able to set the frame for their 
boycott, with its persuasiveness linked to how effective the frame is—that is, how directly and 
logically linked the oppositions grievance and rationale is to the goal they are trying to achieve. 
Several years later, Polletta and Ho (2006) state that the literature on the effectiveness of frames 
in the context of political movements is still relatively underdeveloped, with little really 
understood about the subsequent outcomes of the movement itself; this is similar to the boycott 
literature. The effects of an absence of a viable frame is clear: McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) 
show reduced mobilization in such circumstances. On the other hand, effective frames signal a 
viable protest movement (Polletta and Ho 2006). A targeted boycott clearly states the nature of 
the grievance and the rationale for the boycott as the most effective response to the perceived 
injustice. Targeting, and the proper framing that makes it possible, allows the boycott to garner 
the support that may increase its effectiveness. 
 The second scope condition posits that boycotts are less likely to negatively affect 
democratic development when they are less frequent. According to Przeworski (1992), the 




oppose the government and, 2) the means by which it should practice this opposition (1992, 
124). An effective opposition is one that has learned to balance its actions, otherwise it can 
threaten the development of democracy in the way listed above. If an opposition can strike an 
effective balance, however, and only occasionally chooses to vigorously oppose the government 
by initiating one of the two types of boycotts, there is no reason why the opposition’s action 
should damage democratic development. On the other hand, according to Przeworski,  
If every time a party loses an election or every time a government adopts an unpopular policy, 
the opposition launches a general strike, it may weaken democratic institutions and create 
conditions for the military to intervene. (1992, 125) 
While there are accounts of democratization that link frequency of events with better democratic 
outcomes, such as that by Lindberg (2006) on Africa, I have found no studies to-date on the 
effects of the frequency of boycotts on good governance outcomes, allowing me to make a 
unique contribution to the literature.  
Ryan’s (2011) case study of Jordanian politics clearly illustrates this issue. Ryan makes 
the case that the party system is weak in Jordan partially because of the opposition’s choice to 
boycott elections in 1997, 2001, and 2003. By continuously removing itself from the electoral 
contest in response to electoral laws, the opposition does not have the voice in parliament to 
really bring about a change in those policies they consider unfair. As a country in transition, the 
removal of the opposition and the continued dominance of the loyalist and conservative elites 
means that Jordan continues to struggle to embrace democratic governance over autocratic 
culture. Albania is another country that faces the challenge of an opposition that frequently relies 
upon extra-parliamentary tactics when dealing with the government. Since becoming a 




every two years7. As a result, experts refer to democratic progress in Albania as “stagnated”, 
generally citing the intense polarization that leads to boycotts as the reason behind Albania’s 
inability to improve its governance (Freedom House 2018). As boycotts have become par for the 
course, stalling democratic development and political progress, the country’s Freedom House 
democracy score began to decrease and now hovers in the range of 4.10. The opposition’s 
boycotts, often demanding electoral reform or changes in institutions, have worked to stall 
important policies when they reach the parliament floor; this includes judicial reform and anti-
corruption measures. 
Finally, I address the role international actors have upon the outcomes related to 
democratic development. Tilly and Tarrow’s Contentious Politics serves as one of the 
authoritative accounts of the role that international actors play in regime transitions. Prolonged or 
acute conflict between government and opposition frequently catches the attention of the 
international community; this sometimes results in attempts at mediation or pressure upon the 
government to make concessions in the name of democratic rule. Baxter, for example, describes 
how foreign emissaries from Western states and the Commonwealth of Nations attempted to 
break the deadlock between Bangladesh’s government and opposition parties following 
parliamentary boycotts in 1994 (1996, 185). The connection between this account and that of 
boycotts is well noted with regard to electoral boycotts, especially in the literature on election 
monitoring. Beaulieu (2006) notes that short-term reforms are more likely after a boycotted 
election, especially with the addition of international pressure upon the government. In her book, 
Beaulieu expands upon this, going as far as emphasizing the role of the “international midwife” 
                                                          
7 Evidence shows that the Albanian opposition frequently relies on parliamentary boycotts as a signal of their 
discontent with elections and government policies, but that they have not embraced the tactic of electoral boycotts. 
This is likely due to a rejection of the high cost of an electoral boycott in favor of the much more manageable costs 




in the development of democratic governance. She describes how international actors can put 
pressure on a government, through actions such as withholding aid from the country, which can 
cause the government to become more responsive to the more visible displays of opposition 
interest and goals. Frankel (2010) discusses how the threatening an electoral boycott can be an 
important opposition tactic for countries that have some geo-political significance. “Intense 
international attention on an election often entices the party in charge to make concessions that 
can end up being costly”—in other words, the threat of a boycott can draw international pressure, 
which may be key in encouraging the government to acquiesce to the opposition’s demands 
(ibid, 3).     
Evidence of Beaulieu’s international midwife theory is especially high for new 
democracies in Eastern Europe. This is due to the influence of the European Union in the region, 
and the pressures for political change that they put upon countries that wish to join the 
organization. There are numerous examples of the European Union making statements 
condemning situations that have led to boycotts in candidate states and reinforce the need for 
change in order to ascend to member status. The case of the 2016 electoral boycott in 
Macedonia, which will be discussed more in-depth in the following chapter, is a prime example 
of this phenomenon. Following scandal-induced political turmoil in Macedonia, the EU was just 
one of several internationally-minded institutions to send mediators to the small Balkan state. As 
Macedonia is an EU candidate state, the IGO frequently mediated discussions between the 
government and opposition in the months leading up to the June 2016 election in an attempt to 
reach a compromise that would allow for a fully-contested, fair election (Marusic 2016).   
While I would ideally be able to test each of these scope conditions in the large-N 




investigation to be carried out at this time. While the particulars of the Global News Archive 
articles will be discussed in Chapter 4, this source can be highly restrictive as to the type of 
information and details provided for legislative and electoral boycotts. Many of the accounts of 
boycotts that make up my dataset are constrained to a few sentences in global news overviews, 
especially when looking at less populous or geopolitically significant states. Therefore, any 
measures of these variables would be only partial measures; they would also be necessarily 
biased toward those boycotts significant enough to warrant prolonged international attention (for 
example, those that are mediated by other countries or IGOs). As a result, these scope conditions 
are only addressed extensively in the following chapter presenting my case studies.  
This chapter began with a discussion of goals and tactics of opposition parties and moved 
on to an analysis of the literature revolving around two extra-parliamentary tactics of such 
parties: legislative and electoral boycotts. Despite the embrace of a Western-centric notion of 
which party tactics are ideal for democracy which overwhelmingly condemns the choice to 
boycott elections or the legislature, there is some support for the idea that boycotts could help 
democracy. This chapter has shown that the full story of the long-term effects of opposition 
boycotts is more nuanced than indicated in the majority of the literature. This position is 
supported by the case study analysis in the following chapter, which further highlights conditions 







Chapter 3: Exploring the Cases of Boycotts as Extra-Parliamentary Tactics: A Look at 
Ghana, Macedonia, and Bangladesh 
 
Having laid out the motivating theory for this dissertation, I now turn to historical 
analysis to begin to address its plausibility. This chapter contains three case studies, each 
designed to represent one of three different possibilities regarding opposition parties and 
democratic governance outcomes. The first section looks the National Democratic Congress’s 
(NDC) choice to undertake a parliamentary boycott in Ghana in 2001, chronicling its 
motivations, rationale for pursing this tactic, and the consequences of the boycott. The second 
section explores the decision of three opposition parties’—the Social Democrats (SD), the 
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) and the Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA)--to 
boycott the 2016 legislative election in Macedonia and the fallout from that choice. The final 
section explores the consequences of extra-parliamentary tactics of opposition parties in new 
democracies when the three scope conditions identified in the theory chapter—targeted boycotts, 
low boycott frequency, and international attention—are not met. This is exemplified by 
Bangledeshi case.  
Case study analysis is especially important in uncultivated theoretical terrain—little 
research has been done on electoral boycotts, and almost no research has been conducted on 
legislative boycotts. Boycotts are complicated phenomena that come from complicated 
processes. First, there must be a stronger-than-typical level of discontent between the opposition 
and the policies or practices of the government. Some level of contention between political 
parties is normal in the democratic process (Katz and Mair 1995; Lipset and Rokkan 1990; 
Strom 1990). From there, the opposition must believe that there are no institutional remedies for 




effectiveness these options. Finally, the opposition must weigh the positive outcomes and 
negative consequences of the choice to boycott and remove itself from the legislative process or 
electoral competition. As discussed in Chapter 2, boycotts are incredibly costly signals. 
Opposition parties considering boycotts will have to determine if the message sent by abstention 
is more likely to result in their desired outcome than any other choice of action. 
This chapter begins by discussing why case studies are an important methodological tool, 
especially considering the relatively little research that has been done in the area of study in this 
dissertation. From here, I discuss the process of my case study analysis, borrowing heavily from 
the instruction provided by George and Bennett (2005). In the following sections, I specify the 
research problem and the objective and use this specification to formulate my hypothesis and 
guide the selection of key variables8. Next, I discuss why each case was selected for analysis, as 
well as provide historical context for the state in question, a discussion of its institutional 
arrangements, and the background of the boycott to be analyzed. Then, after constructing a 
standard set of questions I provide a narrative of these answers through a comparative 
description of the variables. 
The Case Study Method 
 As recently as the 1960s, the fields of comparative politics was dominated by the use of 
case studies and historical analysis as methodological tools—quantitative methods were in their 
infancy. As new methodological tools began to emerge, though, existing qualitative methods 
became more refined as researcher grew more concerned with scientific inquiry and its 
requirements—validity, reliability, and replicability. Still, despite these efforts, qualitative 
                                                          
8 Some concepts are better addressed in the case study analysis than the quantitative analysis because they are not 
easily operationalized and quantified. As a result, the variables addressed here differ slightly from those addressed in 




research is often disparaged as unscientific, subjective, and lacking transparency. Barkin (2007), 
for example, states that qualitative methods do not provide a way through which researchers can 
interpret the larger significance of a research project. 
 What is a case study? Gerring describes it as an “intensive study of a single case where 
the purpose of that study is—at least in part—to shed light on a larger class of cases” (2007, 10). 
George and Bennet refer to case study approaches as “the method and logic of structured, 
focused comparison” (2005, 70). A case, of course, is a unit of observation taken at a specific 
moment in time. In this study, it is a parliamentary or electoral boycott within a single country 
during a specific period of time9. Case studies are helpful in the generation and development of 
theory because the researcher is able to look at the small details of the case in order to map out 
causal linkages. Here, I examine the cases of Ghana, Haiti, and Bangladesh in order to ascertain 
the plausibility of the theory laid out in the previous chapter.  
Qualitative methodologists have channeled criticism from the quantitative front into a 
movement to emphasize important steps, approaches, and emphases in the various qualitative 
approaches. In this vein, these methodologists have written instructional pieces that illustrate 
how qualitative researchers need to work to meet standards as high as those in quantitative 
methodology. This study incorporates case studies as a key methodological tool and, in doing so, 
follows the guidance of Levy (2008) and George and Bennett (2005) in seeking the proper 
scientific implementation of the method. 
This chapter relies mainly on Levy (2008) for guidance, as he describes four different 
case study designs and highlights how each pursues different purposes and implements different 
                                                          
9 The cases within this chapter are all limited to a one year span, though in the population there 




logics of inference. This is a step away from the way case studies were conducted historically, 
when cases could be selected merely because they were of particular interest or because of 
“intrinsic intent” or “historical importance” (ibid., 7). Levy’s case study designs, however, keep 
in mind that the social scientist is no longer interested in mere description and single-case 
explanation but to confirm or reject hypotheses, determine causal mechanisms, and generate new 
hypotheses. These different goals lead to the different forms that case study designs can take. 
Here, I eschew the more common comparable cases approach—based on John Stuart 
Mill’s method of agreement—in favor of the crucial case design. This is an expansion on the 
most-likely and least-likely designs and is primarily used for testing and refining theory; as has 
been pointed out before, this is the primary goal of this chapter. The method gets its name 
because the cases are “crucial” due to their necessity in proving or refuting a theory. In this 
research design, the researcher selects cases that are expected to conform (or not conform) to the 
potential theories due to the presence (or absence) of necessary explanatory variables. If all 
variables are present but the outcome is not as is expected (or vice-versa), then the case refutes 
the proposed theory.  
In Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, George and Bennett 
borrow from and build upon Lijphart (1971) and Eckstein (1975), identifying six theory-building 
research objectives in case study analysis: the atheoretical/configurative idiographic study, the 
disciplines configurative study, the heuristic study, the theory testing study, the plausibility 
probe, and the “building block” study (2005, 74-76). This chapter is built around three theory 
testing case studies, which are designed to “assess the validity and scope conditions of single or 




In conducting the crucial case design, I follow the universal research design laid out by 
George and Bennett (2005). Their guidelines, applicable to all case study designs and 
approaches, bring the structured, focused comparison into case study research. The process of 
their method, simplified, is as follows. It requires the researcher to formulate a standard set of 
questions, which they then apply to all cases in the study. By asking the same questions of all 
cases, the researcher is able to systematically compare the answers to each question and then 
draw inferences based on how the responses vary in the data. This qualifies the case study to be 
an important tool for theory development, which is what I require from these case studies. 
First, though, it’s important to look a little more in-depth at George and Bennett’s design, 
in order to lay out the process through which I will be conducting my case studies. The first 
phase of this design requires the researcher to determine the objective of their study and structure 
their approach so these objectives can be met. There are five adaptable steps in this phase: 1) 
specification of the research problem and research objective, 2) the formulation of hypothesis 
and selection of corresponding variables, 3) case selection, 4) an analysis of the variance present 
in the variables, and 5) the specification of relevant data and construction of the standard set of 
questions.  
The second phase is where the researcher begins to study the selected cases following the 
research structure outlined in the first phase. In the third phase, the researcher assesses the 
findings produces in the second phase to determine whether they reach the research objective of 
the study: in other words, in a crucial case design, whether or not they can support the theory or 






Part 1: Case Study Specification 
 George and Bennett’s first step is the specification of the research design and the research 
question. The latter, as stated before, is In the development of democratic governance, does 
opposition use of extra-parliamentary tactics, particularly legislative and electoral boycotts, 
reduce the likelihood of good democratic outcomes? This indicates the necessity of several 
stages of case study analysis. First, we must understand why specific oppositions choose to use 
legislative and electoral boycotts as tools in interaction with the government. Second, we have to 
see what effects the selection of this tool has on long-term outcomes. Therefore, I am not just 
looking at the boycott itself, but I need to go back in time to understand the circumstances in 
which the opposition came to the conclusion that this tactic was necessary to reach its goals. I 
also need trace the consequences of the boycott to ascertain what kind of effects, if any, this had 
upon the country’s path of developing good democratic governance.  
 From here, I formulate the hypotheses and identify the variables that are key to 
understanding the path from opposition grievance to boycott to governance outcomes. 
Opposition formulation of tactics considering their goals are key to understanding intent, which 
links back to my theory’s proposal that boycotts are costly signals oppositions feel they must 
resort to. Both the motivation and the outcomes must be consistent with my theory to understand 
if it is more applicable to the empirical evidence than the literature’s commonly-held belief that 
extra-parliamentary tactics—and boycotts in particular—hurt democratic development.  
Part 2: Formulation of Hypotheses and Key Variables 
 The theory that I put forward as an alternative to the widely-accepted hypothesis that 
extra-parliamentary tactics can harm the development of democracy is more easily testable in the 




dissertation. My theory proposes that the opposition party’s choice to pursue extra-parliamentary 
tactics, particularly that of legislative or electoral boycotts, will not negatively affect democratic 
governance indicators in the long run, if one of three scope conditions is met. The negative 
effects of boycotts discussed in the literature will not persist in the long run if an opposition 1) 
hold the boycott with a targeted goal, 2) does not turn to the boycott option too frequently, and 3) 
draws the attention of the international community.  
 Where previous scholars argue that boycotts are detrimental to democracy because they 
hurt representation, I argue that boycotts can be used as a strong signal to the government 
wherein the opposition can actually increase its ability to represent its people and elicit 
government responsiveness, especially in states where institutions limit the actions of the 
opposition. The following hypotheses allow me to test the theory, which was described further in 
Chapter Two, in each of the three cases I selected.  
H1: The political opposition party considers the selection of the boycott tactic because of 
demonstrated belief that other methods of working with the government have failed or will not be 
useful. 
H2: A boycott will be followed by a period in which the country’s institutions become better 
equipped to facilitate the good governance qualities of rule of law, accountability, and low 
corruption. 
 
As mentioned in the introduction to this section, acceptance of this theory also depends 
on the reliability of the scope conditions, or those conditions under which boycotts will either fail 
to damage or actually help the development of democratic governance. As a result, one of the 
following statements must be met in order for the theory to be plausible, “successful” in each 
case referring to the boycott’s impact on democratic governance. 
H3: “Successful” boycotts occur in conjunction with the opposition party/parties’ 
specification of clear and measurable goals of the results they intend to come from their boycott. 
H4: “Successful” boycotts occur when the opposition party/parties choose the boycott 




H5: “Successful” boycotts occur when the opposition party/parties’ plight draws the 
attention of an international mediator that helps facilitate a meeting of the two parties and/or 
puts pressure on the government to end the boycott.   
Part 3: Case Selections and Backgrounds 
Case Selection  
 I chose cases for analysis that covered both legislative and parliamentary boycotts, and 
that addressed the scope conditions hypothesized above. The African 2001 Ghanaian case was 
selected to represent legislative boycotts in this qualitative analysis. In 2001, the NDC—Ghana’s 
former government party and now the main opposition party—held a boycott of parliament in 
response to the imprisonment of one of their members, Enoch Teye Mensah, by Ghana’s Bureau 
of National Investigation (BNI). Mensah, the former Minister of Youth and Sports, was accused 
of playing a key role in the Nima riots that May, which the ruling New Patriotic Party (NPP) 
described as “politically motivated” and “executed mainly to hurt the NPP politically and also 
embarrass the government of President Kufour” (GNA 2001a). The NDC, on the other hand, saw 
this as the unlawful imprisonment of an opposition member by the majority. While parliamentary 
boycotts were common tools of the opposition in previous parliaments, the NPP had been going 
to great lengths to address the discontent of minority parties behind closed doors, in order to 
present a well-functioning parliamentary machine, and was largely successful until the NDC held 
their four-day boycott. The NDC specifically targeted their boycott to their accusation that the 
NPP was overstepping their legal authority as the majority party in imprisoning opposition 
politicians and continued to draw attention to their boycott by holding a sit-in outside the 
Parliament of Ghana. Their boycott put pressure on the majority because they were forced to 
delay the appointments of 35 ministerial positions because of a lack of quorum (GNA 2001b). 




opposition feels that the government has overstepped its bounds, as well as the effects of a 
targeted boycott.  
The European case of the 2016 election in Macedonia was chosen to represent electoral 
boycotts and determine their effects. The threat to boycott the 2016 election by all of 
Macedonia’s opposition parties came after a wire-tapping scandal shook the Macedonian 
government in June 2015. While the wire-tapping incident itself provided a problem in 
Macedonian politics, tensions heightened when around fifty members of the governing VMRO-
DPMNE party—including former Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski—were pardoned by President 
Gjorge Ivanov, spurring mass protests across the country. In reaction, the Social Democrats 
declared that they would boycott the June 5th elections. As the Albanian minority parties DUI 
and DPE joined the boycott, the list of grievances against the government grew. This boycott is 
particularly important because it also drew the attention of the international community, 
particularly that of the European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization, IGOs to which 
Macedonia hopes to gain membership (Sito-Sucic 2016). The Macedonian case draws attention 
to the considerations that go into the negotiations between the government and opposition 
leading up to a boycotted election, the effects of long lists of grievances (particularly those 
related to electoral integrity), and the impact of the third scope condition: international attention.  
The Asian case of Bangladesh was selected for the final case study analysis because of its 
long history with of legislative and electoral boycotts. Its current government is dominated by 
the Awami League (AL) due to the opposition’s choice to boycott the last elections. This boycott 
was led by the primary opposition parties: the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the 
Jamaat-e-Islami party (JI).  The Awami League and the BNP have alternated control over 




which party is in opposition. Despite Bangladesh’s status as an electoral democracy, experts are 
concerned that this frequent political turmoil is only hurting the development of democratic 
governance. The frequency of extra-parliamentary tactics in Bangladesh allows it to serve as a 
good test of my scope conditions, since it violates the second condition: that opposition must not 
choose to boycott elections or the legislature too frequently.  
Ghana (2001) 
 Historical Background 
 Shortly after gaining independence in 1960, Ghana worked to manage a multiparty 
democracy led by Nkrumah and the Convention People’s Party (CPP). The regime was quickly 
consumed by the push for modernization, the deportation and detention of individuals 
sympathetic to Western rule, discontent by the workers and farmers, increasing taxes, and 
political protest. As opposition to Nkrumah grew, so did the control he and the CPP held over the 
country, turning Ghana into a single-party government after a constitutional amendment in 1964. 
In response, members of the National Liberation Council (NLC) staged a military coup in 
February of 1966. The military and police established an eight-person council that held executive 
power and an assembly drafted a new constitution. In 1969, the first competitive national 
elections since 1956 were held with the Progress Party (PP) and National Alliance of Liberals 
(NAL) as the main contenders. This Second Republic only lasted until 1979, when Lt. Jerry 
Rawlings led a short-lived military coup wherein the government was controlled by the Armed 
Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). 
 The Third Republic began in 1979 with planned elections occurring despite the coup. The 
AFRC made it clear that they expected the new administration, headed by Hilla Limann and the 




companions in the AFRC led another coup, and the Third Republic fell in 1981. The president 
was dismissed, cabinet suspended, parliament dissolved, and political parties proscribed. 
Rawlings led through the Provisional National Defense Council, PNDC. Ghana returned to 
dictatorship. 
 International and domestic pressure on Rawlings’s regime led to its end in 1992. 
Responding to pressure, the PNDC created a Consultative Assembly to draft a constitution and a 
national referendum approved this constitution in 1992. This effectively lifted the ban on party 
politics. The PNDC and its supporters formed a new political party, the National Democratic 
Congress (NDC), and competed in the November presidential election and the December 
parliamentary election. After Rawlings won the presidential election, the opposition largely 
boycotted the subsequent parliamentary elections, resulting in the NDC taking 183 of the 200 
parliamentary seats. Rawlings won a second presidency in 1996 after contested elections, and the 
NDC won 133 of the parliamentary seats. The 2000 presidential election saw Rawlings’s vice 
president, Atta-Mills, run against the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP) John Kufuor. The NPP won 
the election in what was judged to be a free and fair election, leading to the peaceful alternation 
from an NDC-led government to one managed by the NPP.        
 Institutions 
 Ghana is a presidential republic with a unicameral legislative branch with 275 seats. 
Legislation must be approved by the Parliament, but the president has a veto over all bills. 
Members of parliament come from single-seat constituencies and win the seat if they win a 




years and have been considered fair and free since 2000. Ghana is a two-party system; in 2001, 
the NPP was in control of the government and the NDC in opposition10. 
 The Boycott 
 It began with a soccer game. On May 9, 2001, Ghana’s two leading soccer team were 
playing in a match in the capital city’s stadium. When one of the teams scored twice to take the 
lead 2-1 fans began to riot in the stadium, though most accounts say there was no interpersonal 
violence. The police were called and, in attempting to gain control over the unruly mob, threw 
cannisters of tear gas and shot rubber bullets into the crowd. A stampede ensued as fans tried to 
escape the corrosive effects of the gas and, as a result, 127 fans were crushed to death or 
suffocated inside the stadium (ChinaDaily 2013; Sakyi-Addo 2001a).    
 The Kufour administration called for three days of national mourning in response to the 
tragedy and sought to assure the populace that there would be an inquiry into the police actions 
that led to the deaths, establishing a commission to investigate. The police head in Accra 
launched an internal investigation into the accident, but it did little to assuage anti-police 
sentiment11. Mobs began to gather and attack police stations throughout the capital as public 
anger escalated. Three days after the tragedy, after a burial ceremony for 33 of the victims in the 
poor, primarily Muslim suburb of Nima, “hundreds of youths” attacked the police station (Sakyi-
Addo 2001b). They spoke against the police, police brutality, and also called for a return to the 
NDC-led government.  
 Tensions between Kufour’s new administration and Rawlings’s previous administration 
were high, and the call for the return of the NDC’s primacy during the Nima riots led to 
                                                          
10 This remains true today. 
11 The results of the official inquiries, concluded in July 2001, states that “reckless behavior” by the police was the 




increased interparty tension. Days later, the Minister of Presidential Affairs and the National 
Security Adviser stated that the government was investigating the possibility of “external 
influence” in the Nima riots (GNA 2001c). On May 16, 2001, it was declared that four people 
connected to the NDC would be charged in instigating the riots. This included an active NDC 
MP, Enoch Teye Mensah, who was jailed for two days by the Bureau of National Investigations 
(BNI). Mensah said that he was “detained in a mosquito infested cell, where he slept on a student 
mattress for two days and was questioned in connection with the riots” (GNA 2001d).  
 The NDC began a boycott in solidarity with Mensah on May 17 and carried it on for four 
days. At the time, the NDC held 92 seats. None of the MPs set foot in parliament, but instead 
“hovered’ around the legislative chamber (GNA 2001b). They protested the actions of the 
government, saying that it had overstepped the laws surrounding the dignity and privileges of 
members of parliament in jailing an active member of the opposition for perceived crimes 
against the government.  
Macedonia (2016) 
 Historical Background 
 Until 1991, Macedonia was part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and, 
unlike many other former Yugoslav states, its movement toward independence was relatively 
bloodless. Also like many other former Yugoslav states, the question of ethnic identity is 
particularly salient in both the social and political sphere. About 60% of the population are ethnic 
Macedonians; the next largest group are Albanians, at about 25%. These two groups dominate 
politics within the country, though there are also relatively large Turkish, Romani, and Serbian 




 While the Macedonian government likes to trace its history back to antiquity and through 
domination by empires such as the Persians, Romans, and Ottomans, Macedonia did not 
experience sovereignty until after its time as a Yugoslav republic. The Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia was one of six ethnofederal republics in Yugoslavia; the others were Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. These divisions reflected divisive 
politics: religion and ethnicity separated the people of Yugoslavia. As a member of Yugoslavia 
at the time, the SR Macedonia experienced a relatively more peaceful existence than most of the 
rest of the country, largely due to the predominantly Macedonian population.12   
 For most of its postwar history, Yugoslavia maintained the dictatorial rule of Josip Broz 
Tito though as a non-aligned communist state that experimented with political and economic 
liberalization before liberalization movements (particularly glasnost and perestroika) began in 
other parts of the Communist Bloc. A particularly important change in this vein occurred after 
the Croatian Spring in 1971—though the protests were initially violently put down by Tito, the 
dictators acquiesced to some of the Croatian demands. This was largely in hopes of ameliorating 
ethnic conflict in the future; Tito allowed for the increase in federal powers, giving the republics 
more autonomy. After Tito’s death in 1980, Yugoslavia adopted a collective presidency drawn 
from the leadership of each of the republics. 
 This did not last long; the expectations of partial autonomy became that of full autonomy, 
which also helped to increase ethnic tensions, particularly between the Serbs, Croats and 
Bosnians. This was increased by growing economic problems, including a large deficit, 
unemployment, and increasing foreign debt. The country began to move from a controlled 
                                                          
12 Ethnic conflict in Macedonia still exists, with large instances of ethnic violence between the Macedonian and 




economy toward market economy, using the policy of shock therapy. The country began to 
dissolve in the early 1990s. 
 Macedonia initiated a referendum on independence from Yugoslavia in September 1991 
and maintained peace during the wars in neighboring republics that accompanied the split of the 
country. However, ethnic disputes began to grow considerably following the war in Kosovo, 
which brought many Albanian refugees into Macedonia. Conflict between the majority 
Macedonians and the increasing Albanian population increased as the Macedonians felt 
themselves threatened by the increase in Albanian voices and the Albanians considered 
themselves underrepresented in the Macedonian state.  
 Institutions 
 Macedonia is a parliamentary republic led by the Prime Minister. It has a popularly 
elected President, and it is the President’s role to appoint the Prime Minister. Of course, there are 
accepted rules to this practice: the Prime Minister must be a leader of the party with the largest 
representation in parliament. The parliament, or Sobranie, is a unicameral body which ranges 
between 120 and 140 representatives. These representatives are elected for four-year periods. 
Currently, six districts elect twenty representatives. Occasionally, if turnout is high enough, the 
Macedonian diaspora can elect up to three representatives. The 2016 elections brought six parties 
into parliament (VMRO, the Social Democrats, DUI, DPA, Besa Movement (BESA) and 
Alliance for Albanians (AA)). As of the elections in 2016, majority is currently held by the 
Social Democrats and the smaller parties, with the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) in opposition. At the 





 The Boycott 
 In June 2015, news broke that the VMRO-DPMNE-led government had been illegally 
wire-tapping thousands of Macedonians. The scandal went all the way to the top: then-Prime 
Minister Nikola Gruevski was implicated. Over the next year, the VMRO-DPMNE leadership 
obstructed the ability of special prosecutors to investigate the alleged crimes. For example, the 
former Minister of the Interior subsequently faced additional charges for the crime of destroying 
the wire-tapping equipment. Gruevski resigned, one of his closest allies became Prime Minister 
and he was widely believed to still retain the primary influence over Macedonian politics. 
Gruevski’s departure was meant to set the stage for new parliamentary elections that April; under 
advisement from the European Union and the United States that elections under these 
circumstances could lead to political upheaval due to the high tensions resulting from the 
VMRO-DPMNE dragging its feet on promised reforms, the elections was postponed until June 
(Euractiv 2016; Marusic 2017). Contributing to this decision was the declaration of the SDSM’s 
intent to boycott the elections if they went forward as planned on April 24th. 
Political scandal became political crisis, however, in May of 2016, when President 
Gjorge Ivanov pardoned 56 politicians involved in the wire-tapping, including Gruevski. 
Popularly, this choice was seen as a move by the party to undermine the special prosecution and 
prevent the proper progression of the rule of law. Rallies began, and the earliest were so heated 
that there was violent conflict between citizens and police. Prompted by the pardons, the SDSM 
declared its intention to boycott the elections that had been postponed to June 5th (Marusic 2016). 
Following the Social Democrats’ calls for a “free and fair” election, the Albanian minority 
parties DPA and the DUI declared their intentions to also boycott the June 5th elections (Elgood 




parties declared their intent to boycott the election until their grievances were addressed, 
including that of an inaccurate electoral role, the unfair media coverage of campaigns, and the 
ruling party’s propensity for putting its members at the head of apolitical government bodies 
(Elgood 2016; Marusic 2016). The EU, which had been playing a key role in mediating within 
Macedonian politics, and NATO began to put pressure on the government to postpone elections 
again.  
Bangladesh (1996-present) 
 Historical Background 
 Early politics in modern Bangladesh was defined by presidential regimes broken up by 
military coups. The 1975 coup leaders were overthrown by a counter-coup, and the presidency 
passed from Ahmad to Sayem to Ziaur Rahman (popularly known as Zia), often in the wake of 
violence. Zia’s presidency brought rapid industrialization and economic growth, until it also 
ended in his assassination during a military coup. His successor, Sattar, was also deposed by the 
military.  
 In 1983, Ershad became president and Bangladesh was under martial law. His regime 
was also marked by the privatization of much of the country’s industry, the ban of trade unions, 
and heavy international debt. By the late 80s, Ershad could no longer maintain his tight grip on 
power and a caretaker government was established in 1990 with the aim to restore 
parliamentarism in Bangladesh. Free and fair elections followed in 1991, with the Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) forming the government. These elections established the reputation of 
many of the contemporarily influential parties in Bangladesh today: the AL, the Jamaat-I-Islami 




 Bangladesh’s long history of boycotts under this constitution, both parliamentary and 
electoral, began in March 1994. The opposition accused the BNP of stealing a parliamentary by-
election and boycotted parliament in response. That December, the entire opposition resigned in 
effort to force the government to change and began direct engagement in extra-parliamentary 
opposition activities such as demonstrations, protests, and strikes. The three main opposition 
parties continued these methods through the national elections in 1996, which they all boycotted. 
The BNP overwhelmingly won re-election, but political tension was palpable enough that they 
allowed a caretaker government to take over and begin preparations for another parliamentary 
election only a month later. These elections resulted in the Awami League gaining power. Three 
parties—the AL, the BNP and the JP—maintained control of most of the seats.  
 The previous administration had set a precedent, however, and it wasn’t long before the 
new opposition held their first parliamentary boycott in 1996, accusing the AL of harassing and 
jailing opposition activists. Another followed in 1997, as the opposition alleged that the AL 
never adapted the policies they had promised to use to solve the problems that led to the boycott 
in 1996. The BNP led the opposition in another parliamentary boycott in 1999, and then 
boycotted all elections after deeming them unfair. These boycotts and international pressure, 
particularly from the US, led the AL government to step down and allow for free, fair, and 
monitored elections in 2001. This election saw the rise of the BNP and their coalition partners, 
including the JI., but the change in power did nothing to quell the frequency of boycotts by the 
opposition.   
 Institutions 
 Although Bangladesh has experienced many different types of government, it is now a 




seats reserved for women in the Sangsad. Legislative elections occur every five years. As 
Bangladesh has traditionally had a president, and the new republic has kept the position, though 
as a largely ceremonial position selected by the members of the Sangsad. The president appoints 
the Prime Minister, and the appointment is confirmed by vote by the MPs.  
 The Boycott(s) 
 Oppositions in Bangladesh have a long history of practicing boycotts, both electoral and 
legislative. For example, Transparency International Bangladesh counted the number of working 
days boycotted by the main opposition in the ninth parliament (2009-2013) at 342/418—nearly 
82% of the time (TIB 2018)13. For the sake of my analysis, while I am considering the history of 
Bangladesh’s tendency toward boycotts, I will focus on one specific boycott in my analysis. I 
selected the February 15, 1996 parliamentary elections, which is considered by area scholars to 
be one of the most influential events in the history of modern Bangladesh (Baxter 1996). This 
election was the first to occur under the new parliamentary democracy established following the 
downfall of the Ershad regime.  
 It began when the Bangladeshi government needed to hold by-elections; however, the 
opposition was already threatening to abstain from the election, so the president dissolved 
parliament in order to hold general elections. While the hope was that this would end the 
electoral impasse, the action actually resulted in the oppositions digging in deeper. The Awami 
League-led opposition demanded the prime minister’s resignation and the establishment of a 
caretaker government in the lead-up to the elections, alleging that there could not be a fair 
election under the management of the BNP. When the government refused, the opposition led 
general strikes demanding for the resignation; these were ignored. International mediators 
                                                          
13 As a result, the NGO currently recommends that the parliament enact a new law banning legislative boycotts. 




attempted to bring both parties to the table, but ultimately failed (Baxter 1996; Inter-
Parliamentary Union 1996). Ultimately, the elections were held as planned, with the BNP 
winning all of the parliamentary seats due to the opposition’s refusal to field candidates. 
Part 4: Analysis of Variance 
 Before delving into the standard set of questions to determine what caused the difference 
in outcomes of the dependent variables, we must first understand some of the expressed 
differences between cases related to the standard dependent and primary independent variables. 
Each of the selected cases are positive for the key independent variable—the boycott. The first 
case, Ghana, experienced a parliamentary boycott. The second case, Macedonia, experienced an 
electoral boycott. Finally, while Bangladesh has experienced many parliamentary and electoral 
boycotts, my analysis primarily focuses on the first electoral boycott following the establishment 

















Figure 3.1 provides a snapshot of each of the case country’s histories of democracy 
ratings, expressed as the Polity2 measures. As indicated, the vertical lines mark the point in time 
of the boycott to be analyzed. These graphs provide a quick reference that provides some insight 
into what sort of outcomes we can expect from the following analysis—with the exception of the 
Macedonian boycott, which occurred too recently for post-boycott democracy data to be 
available.14 In the case of Ghana, the measure of democracy following the boycott is increasing; 
in the case of Bangladesh, the measure of democracy is decreasing. What implications does this 
have on the effects of boycotts themselves? How can we expect these boycotts to affect 
                                                          
14 It might be noted that Polity scores did not vary after some earlier boycott threats. Given the Freedom House trend 
line, there is a slight deterioration in some measures, the timing of which suggests that the wiretap scandal and 




governance? To answer these questions, and test our hypotheses, we must look to a standard set 
of questions through which we can compare and test each of the three cases.  
Part 5: A Standard Set of Questions 
In order to find out how my theory applies to all three of these cases and move it closer 
toward plausibility, I must test each of the cases in the same way. To do this, I generated a 
standard set of questions for each case. By answering each question with one of the three cases, I 
can code the answers in similar ways and thus standardize how the cases are compared.   
1) What power to make policy or veto powers does the opposition have within the legislature? 
2) What is/are the sources of discontent between the opposition and the government party? 
3) What rationale does the opposition give as to why they have chosen to pursue the boycott 
option? 
4) Is the opposition’s rationale clearly stated in interviews and news articles? 
5) Did the opposition choose legislative or electoral boycott? What rationale is given for this 
choice? 
6) How many boycotts has the country experienced in the last ten years? 
7) Have members of the international community made any statements regarding the boycott? If 
so, a) are these statements in support of the government or the opposition and b) what is the 
nature of these statements? 
 
The following section discusses some of the answers to these questions with a historical 
analysis of each of the three cases. This analysis will briefly discuss some of the institutional 
limitations faced by opposition parties, when and why the party/parties chose to boycott, the 
response to this boycott, and the effects of the boycott. The final section in this chapter reports 
the conclusions from this analysis.  
Analysis 
 Institutions, Grievances, and the Choice to Boycott  
 In Part 3 of this chapter, I provided a basic description of each country’s legislative 
bodies, focusing on their composition and leadership. These institutions are important beyond 




determine if and how much influence the opposition party has in politics. An opposition that is 
unable to influence policy and politics through institutions, will be more likely to choose to 
employ extra-parliamentary tactics. 
 How much influence do the opposition parties in Ghana, Macedonia, and Bangladesh 
have on the creation, specification, and adoption of legislation? De jure, every MP is able to 
propose legislation in any of these countries, though in Ghana and Bangladesh potential policy 
must come out of a ministry. In Macedonia, all members of the assembly, government, or groups 
of 10,000 voters can propose the adoption of a law. Each of these countries follows the standard 
practice of legislation modeled after the British Parliament, where potential law must pass 
through phases such as the First and Second Readings, community inquiries, and investigations. 
In Macedonia and Bangladesh, a majority vote in the legislature sends the bill to the executive 
for ratification. In Ghana, a two-thirds vote is required for a bill to go to the President for assent.  
 As written, these lawmaking policies seem to allow minority parties to create policy or, at 
least, influence the development of bills and whether or not they will become law. It is 
necessary, however, to look beyond the rules as written and to the way that these rules work in 
practice. For example, while any MP may be able to propose legislation in these three states, the 
requirement that legislation go through ministries or committees effectively works to restrict the 
influence of the opposition. Ministries are almost always chaired by members of the government 
party or coalition; the majority party, naturally, usually makes up the majority of each of these 
committees, as well. As a result, the expectation that minority-authored or supported legislation 
will get through these committees to the legislative body as a whole is often low. Bangladesh 
also offers an extreme case; the legislature in the country is notoriously weak. Moniruzziman 




parliament, while the opposition deserts it” (2009, 100). In practice, the Bangladeshi majority 
typically makes laws through promulgation, or the formal proclamation that a policy has become 
a law (Moniruzziman 2009; Murphy 2006). As a result of the Bangladeshi opposition’s 
propensity for legislative boycott and the majority’s reliance on promulgation, the minority 
actually has little to no influence upon the development of policy.  
 Therefore, the opposition in these states face at least a moderate challenge in influencing 
government and policy within their institutional framework, creating a setting through which we 
can expect the opposition’s grievances to more naturally lead to extra-parliamentary tactics 
rather than attempts to create policy or push the government to take certain actions through 
institutional paths. When deciding whether or not to pursue extra-parliamentary tactics, parties 
need to decide if the sources of their discontent can be addressed satisfactorily through 
institutional means, as well as whether or not the rationale for a boycott makes sense considering 
the outcomes they are pursuing.  
 In the three cases discussed above, the oppositions in Ghana, Macedonia, and Bangladesh 
chose to pursue extra-parliamentary tactics to seek remedies for their grievances. In the Ghanaian 
case, the opposition believed that the government had violated the protections afforded to 
members of parliament by jailing an opposition MP in connection to a political protest (GNA 
2001a; 2001b). In Macedonia, the opposition made the choice to boycott the election because of 
allegations of corruption within the ranks of the government party and the belief that this would 
render the upcoming elections unfree and unfair (Elgood 2016; Marusic 2016). In Bangladesh, 
the opposition chose to boycott because they also believed that their upcoming election was set 
to be inherently unfair, and that participation would be akin to validating a sham election. Each 




opposition—in the cases of Macedonia and Bangladesh, allegations of corruption or unfairness 
stemming from the government party are some of the most frequent reasons why parties choose 
to participate in boycotts, and to pursue electoral boycotts, more specifically (Beaulieu 2006). 
 The scope conditions set in Chapter 2 for beneficial boycotts specify that targeted 
boycotts would be more likely to have neutral or beneficial effects on the long-term development 
of democracy. This is because a targeted boycott is more easily addressed in negotiations 
between the government or opposition, or more easily remedied after the boycott has passed. 
How targeted were the three boycotts addressed in this study? The legislative boycott in Ghana 
was sparked by a specific incidence of the government partaking in the “capricious use of 
Executive power”, according to Alban Bagbin, the minority leader (GNA 2001b). This was, 
specifically, the alleged violation of Parliamentary immunity in the arrest and imprisonment of 
NDC MP Enoch Teye Mensah. The opposition began its strike after both Mensah’s 
imprisonment and arrest, in order to show solidarity with the MP and to express its disapproval 
over the arrest to the government. The opposition boycotted parliament after Mensah was 
released on bail, symbolically boycotting for the number of days that Mensah had been detained 
(GhanaWeb 2001b). Accounts of the 2001 parliamentary boycott show a specific target of the 
boycott, which was the opportunity for the opposition to express its discontent with the 
government’s choice to imprison Mensah, and to show that this type of action by the government 
would not be tolerated.  
 While the Ghanaian boycott was specifically targeted as a respond to a singular event, the 
same cannot be said for the Macedonian or Bangladeshi boycotts, despite the opposition’s 
allusion to concerns relating to the electoral process (Baker 1996a; Dimishkovski 2017; Euractiv 




from discontent with the ruling VMRO-DPMNE party following a disputed election and a wire-
tapping scandal. The Macedonian opposition party, SDSM, declared its intention to boycott the 
parliamentary election through general allusions to the electoral contest as unfair and unfree. 
Accounts of SDSM leaders defending the choice to instigate a boycott are loaded with 
buzzwords, such as SDSM official Sugareski’s declaration that “SDSM will continue to fight to 
create fair and democratic conditions for having elections with all the democratic means that we 
have” (Euractiv 2016). As the boycott movement progressed and the scheduled elections grew 
closer, the rationale for the boycott also adapted, partially due to the boycott’s expansion to 
include ethnic Albanian parties. It is likely that this is also due to the need to solidify some 
demands as the election grew nearer and as pressure mounted for the government and the 
opposition to reach an agreement. The SDSM and ethnic Albanian parties combined called for 
the electoral rolls to be brought up to date, freer media, and the removal of party officials from 
non-partisan government bodies (Casule 2016). While the demands of the opposition became 
more specified, the boycott was still not especially targeted; the opposition provided examples of 
conditions that would be necessary for free and fair elections, but not sufficient.  
 In Bangladesh the opposition, led by the Awami League, had been boycotting Parliament 
for nearly two years before the 1996 parliamentary boycott. In the months leading up to the 
election, AL leader Sheik Hasina had demanded that a caretaker government be put in place 
before the election, alluding to the 1991 elections, which took take under a caretaker and was 
considered one of the fairest in Bangladesh history (Burns 1996). The issue of the caretaker 
government was the primary and therefore clearest demand of the opposition; however, as the 
election drew closer the opposition added other grievances to their list—they spoke of blatant 




 In preparing for each of these boycotts, the opposition took care to frame the choice to 
boycott as a necessary choice, pursued either because the government was unresponsive or 
because there were no institutional remedies available to them. This is a common chorus from 
opposition parties pursuing extra-parliamentary tactics, and some instances have stronger claim 
to this rationale than others. For example, in the cases of Macedonia and Bangladesh, to take part 
in elections of questionable quality is to tacitly approve these elections. It is often argued that 
truly unfair elections should be boycotted to bring about change, as Beaulieu notes in her 
accounts of electoral boycotts (2006). Taking part in unfair elections only reinforced the system 
and continues the unfair balance between the party in charge and those in the minority. Unfair 
elections would work to cement the government party’s place and could further exclude the 
opposition from eliciting policy change. 
Of course, it is plausible—if unlikely—that opposition parties faced with election-based 
grievances could coordinate enough pressure on the government to make changes through the 
legislative or judicial institutions. Before the February 1996 elections in Bangladesh, however, 
the government refused to acquiesce to the opposition’s request for a caretaker government to 
oversee the elections; the Macedonian government, on the other hand, was involved in EU-led 
talks with the opposition party, which were ultimately unsuccessful in reaching a compromise 
between the government and the opposition’s demand. In Ghana, on the other hand, the 
government took pains to declare in the media that there were methods through which the 
opposition could gain restitution for their grievance in Parliament, and that the choice to boycott 
was neither an effective path toward a solution nor a responsible political choice. Majority 
leadership stated that, in fact. Parliament “is the relevant forum where issues could be discussed 




It was under these conditions that the Ghanaian opposition decide to undertake a 
parliamentary boycott, and the Macedonian and Bangladeshi oppositions chose to boycott their 
upcoming elections. Both the Macedonian and Bangladeshi electoral boycotts followed 
parliamentary boycotts stemming from protests over the previous election results, supporting the 
postulation in Chapter 2 that electoral boycotts may be escalations of parliamentary boycotts. 
These election boycotts were thus undertaken because previous attempts at mediation regarding 
the quality of electoral contest in these countries were unsuccessful. In Ghana, on the other hand, 
the parliamentary boycott was undertaken partially because of the development of the 
parliamentary boycott as a historically acceptable tool for the expression of discontent in 
Ghanaian politics. Additionally, as a grievance unrelated to electoral competition and one that 
was more limited in scope, the parliamentary boycott was a good signal of the minority’s opinion 
of the government’s actions.    
This section sought to describe in more detail the beginnings of the boycotts in Ghana, 
Macedonia, and Bangladesh. I compared the institutional restraints opposition parties faced in 
finding relief for their grievances, their specific grievances and how they were expressed to the 
public, any development of these grievances, and the type of extra-parliamentary tactic the 
opposition parties chose to employ. The following section focuses on the part of my standard set 
of questions that investigates the differences between how the boycotts were run, the responses 
to them, and their effects.  
 A Boycott and its Outcomes  
 Once the opposition makes the decision to boycott it must then support the boycott in the 




needs support beyond just that of the politicians within the party or coalition15. An ineffective 
boycott does little to garner concessions from the government because it shows a lack of support 
from the population; if the people do not join in the boycott, then the government would likely 
assume that the people must not share the goals of the opposition. Public opinion is also 
important in a parliamentary boycott, but to a lesser extent. Parliamentary boycotts are likely to 
be undermined and ineffective if the party’s voters are likewise unsupportive of their initiative, 
but the extent of public support is more difficult to measure than in electoral boycotts (Spary 
2013)16. 
 This is evident in attempts to ascertain the public’s reaction to the choice to boycott. 
Press coverage of the boycott in Ghana contained statements by the opposition and the 
government, but there was no information on how the public reacted to the choice to boycott. 
The nearest we can get to understanding the public reaction is the discussion of how 
parliamentary boycotts are common tools of opposition protest and, therefore, if not accepted 
then at least tolerated by the people. On the other hand, with boycotts that have already occurred, 
it is easier to see the extent of the public’s support, even when those articles chronicling the 
boycotts do not allude to it; simple statistics, such as voter turnout, can provide evidence of voter 
support for the boycott. In terms of the Macedonian election, the election was eventually 
postponed because of the potential effects of the boycotts on turnout and the challenges this 
would provide to the legitimacy of the election’s winners. The election in Bangladesh proceeded 
despite the dispute between the minority and the majority, and voter turnout was severely 
                                                          
15 This is also very important, however; boycotts that are not adhered to within the party itself or tied to infighting 
within the party are not likely to be effective demonstrations of demand for change.  
16 Spary’s theory on the usefulness of legislative boycotts largely relies upon the work of “difference democrats” 





affected by the opposition’s boycott.17 While this is not an explicit signal of the populations 
support for the opposition’s demands for a caretaker government and a move toward fairer 
elections, it is highly suggestive of support.  
 Finally, it is time to address the outcomes of these cases in both the short and the long 
run. In Ghana, the opposition declared their boycott to be a success immediately following its 
end, though accounts of the boycott do not specify why it should be considered as such. The 
immediate crisis, Mensah’s detainment, had been settled before the boycott began. There were 
no statements by the government to indicate that they had made concessions to the opposition to 
further secure the rights of parliamentarians after the boycott, nor is there evidence of attempts 
made to reach agreements that would work to quell allegations of corruption. There are a few 
points where the opposition could argue that their boycott inconvenienced the government 
enough for them to consider the potential ramifications of unfair actions in the future, primarily 
the fact that the boycott prevented a quorum for key votes, including the approval of ministerial 
appointments (GNA 2001b). In the long-run, the Freedom House reports for the years following 
the boycott has indicated continued development and perseverance of democracy, with Ghana 
consistently being ranked as “Free” since the 2002 report (Freedom House 2002; 2008; 2018b).  
  In Macedonia, the oppositions’ boycott combined with the responses from the European 
Union so limited the prospects of the upcoming election that the Macedonian government chose 
to postpone the elections until the opposition and the government were able to come to an 
agreement (Marusic 2016). In a joint statement on the matter, the vice-president of the European 
Commission and the EU’s Enlargement Commissioner spoke out against the VMRO-DPMNE’s 
initial plans to go through with the election, saying that it was “something that the EU cannot 
                                                          





support and stand behind…which means that all preparations for elections on June 5 now have to 
stop.” The EU also stated that it would not recognize the results of the election if the VMRO-
DPMNE was the only party taking part in the contest; this would be a significant blow for 
Macedonia’s hopes to join the EU (ibid.) 
 Since the 2016 election boycott was fairly recent, long-term effects of the boycott are not 
yet known. The elections were re-scheduled for December of 2016 and although the VMRO-
DPMNE won the plurality of the seats in Parliament but with a ten seat loss from the previous 
election they were unable to gather a majority and could not find any coalition partners to help 
form a government. The political turmoil that had begun after the wiretapping scandal broke had 
escalated to the point that it was referred to as the “Colorful Revolution,” and the SMSD was 
able to use this situation to its political advantage and form a new government. Zoran Zaev, the 
new prime minister, laid out a list of reforms that headed the SMSD’s goals for its governing 
term. This list reflected many of the demands that the SMSD and its boycott allies had 
championed before the canceled June 1996 election: control over corruption, an independent 
judiciary, freer media, and a stronger, more democratic Parliament (Dimishkovski 2017). 
Therefore, while there have been some small improvements in Freedom House’s perceptions of 
democracy in Macedonia, it is still too evaluate the impact of the boycott. Violence from 
VMRO-DPMNE supporter grew after the election, and the establishment of Zaev’s government, 
in coalition with Albanian parties, required mediation from the US State Department (Freedom 
House 2018a). It is evident, though, that it was at least a short-term success. The boycott played 
a role in ending the Gruevski era and the VMRO-DPMNE’s government, one that many in the 
international community had feared was taking an authoritarian turn, and in setting Macedonia 




assessment of democratic governance in Macedonia since the election can be best described as 
“cautiously optimistic” (Freedom House 2017; 2018a).  
As in the Macedonian case, the period of time leading up to the boycott and election in 
Bangladesh were fraught with tension and political violence; in the week leading up to the 
election twelve people had been killed and more than 200 injured in protests (“A World Scene” 
1996; Nicholson 1996a; Reuters 1996). The rhetoric between party leaders, particularly Zia of 
the BNP and Hasina of the Awami League, worked to stoke these fires. Prime Minister Zia 
referred to opposition politicians as “terrorists, killers of democracy and conspirators” and 
threatened to “purge” the opposition parties after the election, which would be uncontested. 
Hasina countered by stating that the elections had to be stopped “at all costs,” encouraging the 
continuation of violence through polling (Baker 1996a). Elections were postponed twice before 
they took place in June 1996; the government attempted to satisfy the opposition by having 
Prime Minister Zia resign and President Biswas supervise the election. This was not an 
acceptable compromise for the opposition, since it meant that the election would still be run by 
the BNP (Dyer 1996). Days before the February elections, Prime Minister Zia called for 
negotiations between the parties to be re-opened after the general election in order to pave the 
way for a fully-contested vote at a later date. Zia claimed that while she was “constitutionally 
mandated” to hold the February polls she, apparently, recognized that uncontested elections 
would not result in a credible mandate (Baker 1996a; Burns 1996; Nicholson 1996b). The BNP-
led government later acquiesced to the oppositions’ greatest demand, enacting a constitutional 




including the new elections scheduled for June (Freedom House 1999)18. Fully contested, these 
elections saw the Awami League victorious in the polls and able to form a new government.  
Governance under the Awami League turned out to be more of the same—despite a 
relatively successful turnover process, governance in Bangladesh fell into the same routines. The 
BNP quickly turned to boycotting parliament as its primary opposition tactic, and the Awami 
League worked to solidify its hold over power. Freedom House has consistently ranked 
Bangladesh as “Partly Free” since its earliest reports, referencing political violence, corruption, 
deterioration of the rule of law, and a lack of parliamentary dialogue as some of the greatest 
challenges facing the development of good governance in Bangladesh (Freedom House 1999; 












                                                          
18 The results of the February election were questionable not only because of the opposition’s boycott, but also that 
early reports stated that less than 3% of the eligible voters in Bangladesh turned out on election day (Baker 1996b). 





Table 3.1: A Summary of the Cases 
 Ghana Macedonia Bangladesh 
Does the opposition 
have influence in the 
policy-making process? 
Moderately Yes No 
Does the source of 
discontent suggest a 
targeted boycott? 
Yes Moderately Moderately 
Do newspaper articles 
document a clear 
rationale for the 
boycott? 
Yes Yes Yes 
Is the rationale 
presented narrowly 
enough to indicate a 
targeted boycott? 
Yes No No 
Did the opposition hold 
a legislative or 
electoral boycott? 
Legislative Both Both 
How many boycotts 
has the country 
experienced in the ten 
years leading up to, but 








Have members of the 
international 
community attempted 
to influence the 




No Yes No 
Freedom House 
Assessment 
Increases in democratic 
governance  
Small improvements, 
particularly in the area 
of political rights 




Table 3.1 provides a quick reference of the answers to each of the seven questions in the 
standard set listed in Part 5 of this chapter. Overall, we can see possible support for the 
postulation that boycotts do not always correlate with poor governance through the differences in 




chapter two. Ghana experienced a targeted boycott and, under the relatively young regime in 
2001, had experienced few boycotts19. On the other hand, Bangladesh and Macedonia have 
experienced more boycotts: in the ten years leading up to these cases, Macedonia mostly 
experienced parliamentary boycotts while Bangladesh had relatively frequent boycotts of each 
type. These cases mostly suffered from weakly targeted boycotts: the opposition parties 
bemoaned the quality of elections and government corruption while demanding a long list of 
changes. Only the Macedonian case had significant response from the international community, 
likely because of Macedonia’s push for acceptance into the EU and NATO (Sito-Sucic 2016).   
 The cases addressed above show that the rationale I proposed in Chapter 2, an attempt to 
refute the allegations that boycotts are bad for democracy, is plausible given the evidence 
presented from the 2001 boycott in Ghana, the 2016 boycott in Macedonia, and the 1996 boycott 
in Bangladesh. Government policy concessions, alternations, and analysis by Freedom House all 
show that boycotts can have positive effects, or that there may be no long-term repercussions 
from boycotts. The next chapter discusses my creation of data on legislative and electoral 
boycotts and the development of the data set I use to test the relationship between these extra-
parliamentary tactics and democratic governance. Following this, Chapters Five and Six 
chronicle my quantitative analysis of this relationship through fixed-effects panel data analysis, 
in an attempt to discern how universal the (lack of) correlation between boycotts and damage to 
democratic governance suggested by my qualitative analysis may be.  
 
 
                                                          
19 Though it is important to remember that boycotts were historically considered a legitimate opposition tactics, even 




Chapter 4: Constructing Data on Parliamentary and Electoral Boycotts: A Commentary 
on Media-based Event Data 
 Having outlined my intended course of research, specified my theory, and supported it 
using case studies, I now turn to the large-N statistical analysis of the relationship between 
legislative and electoral boycotts and the development of good democratic governance. As 
discussed in my theory chapter, there is very little statistical analysis of the effects of boycotts 
upon democracy. Most studies of the relationship between the two phenomena employ case 
studies, and the few that use statistical tests focus only on the short-term effects of electoral 
boycotts. The only exception to that is Beaulieu (2006), who focuses on electoral boycotts but 
extends the analysis of their effects to the long-run.  
 As a result, I have constructed the first dataset on legislative boycotts from global news 
sources. My data on electoral boycotts also uses the same sources, though it is not a unique 
dataset as others (for example, Beaulieu 2006; 2014) have created data on these types of 
boycotts. I rely on this data to check the validity of the data that I produce. The following chapter 
begins by describing my data generation process, focusing on my work with the Cline Center for 
Advanced Social Research and the use of event data from their Global News Archive to 
construct measures of legislative and electoral boycotts. I then describe the selection of and 
rationale behind my explanatory variables and provide a recap of the nature of my universe of 
cases. Then, I discuss the control variables I use and why they were selected, and then briefly 
describe the sources from which I gathered them. I provide another brief reminder of the design 
of my statistical analysis, and then turn to the investigation of my data, highlighting the 
descriptive statistics for both the legislative electoral boycott data and analyzing the data using 






To date, no comprehensive dataset on legislative boycotts has been produced—though 
there are a few datasets on electoral boycotts (Beaulieu 2006; 2014). In order to answer my 
research questions, I had to first create a dataset that would capture both legislative and electoral 
boycotts, constructing each of these measures from similar data sources. Additionally, I had to 
extend the years observed in previous datasets, Beaulieu’s in specific. As has been discussed in 
earlier chapters of this dissertation, legislative and electoral boycotts fall into the category of 
protests; because of this, the data I produced is protest event data. Event data is data that captures 
interactions between actors; in the case of this project, the actors are the opposition and the 
government (Brandes, Lerner, and Snijders 2009). The use of event data has increased in recent 
years due to the development of more advanced methods of text analytics. Because the use of 
machine-coded event data is still in its infancy, and because it is likely to be an even more 
important source of statistical analysis in the future, it is worth taking a more systematic look at 
the value and pitfalls of this data generation process (Wang et. al. 2016). 
Event data analysis in political science was first used by conflict scholars to study war 
and other instances of political violence; since then, civil society scholars have also used it to 
study mass protests. Early employment of media-based event data focused on measures of 
volume of media attention or counts of an event (Wooley 2000); this project deploys the latter 
approach. Because of its substantive focus, discussion of the utility of event data in the discipline 
is restricted to discussion within the conflict and protest subfields, but many of the points 
discussed here are transferrable to the discussion of my data. The first challenge in working with 
media-based event data comes from the fact that we can only observe events that have been 




reported or not reported at all. As a result, data gathered from news databases can be inconsistent 
or biased, resulting in sometimes dubious conclusions (Cook et. al. 2017). The general practice 
for dealing with this problem is to triangulate, or draw data from “multiple, overlapping” 
sources—thus, why my dataset relies upon news reports from three different databases (ibid, 
224). 
When discussing other limitations of media-based event data, scholars such as Earl et. al. 
(2004) and Weidmann (2017) focus on issues in dependability, stating that the “hard facts”, such 
as when and where, are reliable data points but other qualities of an event—for example, casualty 
reports—are more prone to issues. The existing research on event data analysis addresses several 
additional issue areas which should be studied further as we begin to rely more on event data: 
selection bias and the quality of reporting (Cook et. al. 2017; Earl et. al. 2004; Weidmann 2014; 
Woolley 2000). Reporter description bias plays a role, wherein reporters may gloss over details 
to favor one side or another, negatively affecting the veracity of the data extracted from these 
articles. Therefore, Weidmann recommends that, at this point, scholars should only use event 
data on hard facts (2014). Inaccuracies such as these are more likely in events with fewer 
observations—in other words, those events which are discussed in fewer articles and less 
veracity of reporting. Woolley (2000) highlights how the nature of reporting means that accounts 
of events are always partial accounts, where reports parse through relevant and irrelevant facts in 
to form their stories. These challenges can be overcome in some however, due to the complicated 
nature of the search for legislative and electoral boycotts, these options were not available to me. 
The Cline Center for Advanced Social Science Research at the University of Illinois is 
one of the leading providers of event data and innovators of text analytics. The Center’s Global 




compiling my data, I focused on three sources. The first was the Cline Center’s collection from 
the New York Times, which consists of about six million news stories between 1945 and 2005. 
The second source is the Wall Street Journal archive, a collection of over two million articles 
from 1945 to 2005. The final source draws from four million stories from BBC Monitoring’s 
Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB). The SWB collection spans the years 1979 to 2015. The 
SWB data is particularly valuable because it houses articles from every country in the world, and 
these articles have been translated to English by human translators who are fluent in the language 
and familiar with the cultural context in which the news articles were written (“Global News 
Archive”).  
I was able to find instances of legislative and electoral boycotts in the Global News 
Archive by generating user-selected corpora using SOLR. SOLR is a data index that requires 
operators to use a Boolean syntax to request information from searchable indexes. It also allows 
for hierarchical searchers, wherein the researcher can specify, for example, an article referencing 
a country. The researcher can then have SOLR search the returns that satisfy that parameter for 
articles that reference specific events. These results can be hit or miss, however, depending on 
how the article is referenced in the Global News Archive. For example, at one point I searched 
for articles on legislative boycotts within specific countries in my dataset. I specified Albania as 
the country to search, and then narrowed that search to my proven parameters for finding 
legislative boycotts. While my search parameters produce many false positives when countries 
are not specified—despite the advances in text analysis, legislative boycotts are complicated 
events that require a human eye to confirm search returns—specifying Albania returned no 
results. SOLR had provided me with false negatives, an incredible problem for social science 




“country” fields in the News Archive. Even where the Archive listed Albania (and the longer 
name, Republic of Albania), though, the SOLR result did not return the articles reporting 
Albanian boycotts that had been returned under my larger search.  
I attempted to determine why I was experiencing this problem by experimenting with a 
range of different search terms and reached out to determine the cause of this error, but was 
unable to do so. There were also points where I knew there was a boycott in a country during a 
specific year, but Solr did not return any articles on this boycott in the broader search or in more 
narrow, country- or region-specific searches. Aware that such events existed, I realized that 
while these methods of gathering event data speed up the process of data generation, it is not a 
tool that can be relied on alone. I had to experiment with a range of different search 
specifications until I was confident in the returns from the Solr searches, and then I had to verify 
the validity of the returns myself.  
Solr can produce the results of a successful search in several different formats; the most 
common are JSON and CSV files. In order to access the articles that result from the search, the 
researcher needs to copy the website produced by SOLR and use the write.csv command in R to 
produce the dataset. From there, I accessed the CSV file and reviewed the output. This review 
primarily consisted of efforts to eradicate false positives in the data. Despite the strict search 
parameters, many false positives still existed in the CSV file. Approximately 73% of articles 
returned by the SOLR search for legislative boycotts were false positives. The search for 
electoral boycotts fared a bit better, with 58% false positives reported. While it was easier to 
narrow the selection of articles to the occurrence of an electoral boycott, the added challenge of 
distinguishing between mass boycotts and party/candidate boycotts still kept the percentage of 




Using SOLR allowed me to construct a dataset similar to the Cline Center’s Historical 
Phoenix Event Dataset, as they share a databank. Because of this, they also have similar 
limitations. The New York Times data trends toward American-centric news, however. As a 
result, most of the data pulled out into my dataset comes from articles included in SWB and 
FBIS. Unfortunately, FBIS and SWB have the shortest time spans of the three sources. NYT is 
composed of 5.7 million articles from January 1, 1945 – December 20, 2005. SWB has 4.8 
million articles between January 1, 1979 and June 15, 2015. FBIS has 3.2 million articles 
between January 1, 1995 and September 18, 2015. Each of these sources contributed 1,092,211, 
2,906,715, and 817,955 events, respectively.   
I took a few precautions to avoid some of the problems that occur within the Phoenix 
dataset. First, the Cline Center warns that duplicates of articles/events may exist in the Phoenix 
data—I took care not to double-count any events in my dataset20. These duplicates were not 
addressed in the generation of the event data; therefore, some cases have inflated counts of 
events. My own experiences working with the news articles reported by SOLR show that many 
of the articles are duplicated—some articles even have three or four copies in the Global News 
Archive, each with slightly different titles (for example, “Croatia’s opposition walks out of 
parliament session” versus “Opposition parties walk out of parliamentary session”). Second, the 
dataset also risks over-reporting of events because the articles were not pre-filtered to exclude 
non-political events. The Cline Center recognizes, for example, that some of the conflict events 
were actually produced from articles on sporting events. It is easy for the computer to make such 
mistakes. When I was searching for legislative boycotts through SOLR, I had to filter out many 
                                                          
20 This was significantly easier for my dataset, as the likelihood of more than one electoral boycott occurring each 
year is minimal. It is more likely to see more than one legislative boycott, but I 1) was often able to distinguish 
between multiple boycotts and 2) circumvented the problem of over-counting by relying on dichotomous measures 




false positives myself. One of the most memorable of these was an article on Prince Charles’s 
first baby steps—all of my search terms happened to be present in this article! Human filtering 
and cleaning of these articles is necessary to eliminate many such erroneously flagged events.  
The human eye was especially important when gathering the data on electoral boycotts. 
Although electoral boycotts have been studied before and there is existing data, I worked to 
verify this data and bring it up to the year 2016 using Solr and the Global News Archive. The 
greatest challenge here was determining which electoral boycotts were undertaken by the 
opposition parties and which were undertaken by voters aligned with the opposition: they were 
often described in similar ways, to the extent that it would be nearly impossible to distinguish a 
search between these two using only the Boolean syntax. I had to determine which years 
electoral boycotts were held, then carry out additional research in news archive databases in 
order to determine whether opposition candidates abstained from the polls. The electoral boycott 
data search exposed another potential issue with the data in the Global News Archive. When 
looking for evidence of electoral boycotts, I found articles coded as published in different, 
adjacent years but which were, in fact, referencing the same boycott. While looking to verify if a 
boycott was a popular boycott or a party/candidate boycott, I frequently found that no election 
occurred in the country that year—therefore, there was no way for there to be an electoral 
boycott. Once I discovered this problem, I returned to my legislative boycott data to confirm that 
legislative boycotts happened those years. Most of the observations I had were confirmed; some, 
though, I was forced to delete.  
Additional concerns with this data arise from how the World News Archive data was 
generated, particularly the nature of the sources. SWB and FBIS, in particular, are convenience 




convenience samples. Additionally, the biases of the United States and British government 
selections privilege some regions and under-sample news from others. FBIS tends to favor the 
Middle East and East Asia. SWB tends to favor Africa and Eastern Europe. This, obviously, 
leads to the under-representation of Latin America in the articles that are mined for event data. 
Some of this bias also transfers over to the SOLR data. As a result, the observations for Latin 
America may not reflect the true frequency of boycotts in this region. 
These examples highlight a few of the greatest challenges faced by those who choose to 
work with event data. First was the presence of and the need to sift through false positives. 
Related to this is the presences of incorrect data in the Global News Archives—for example, 
articles discussing an electoral boycott when there was neither an election or boycott for the year 
the article was coded in. While time-consuming, this problem was relatively easily overcome by 
an in-depth review of the Solr output to eliminate the false positives. The false negatives 
provided an additional challenge; unlike in the case of false positives, which could be removed 
from the data set, it is impossible to know for sure that all false negatives were found and 
included in the data. Another potential problem addressed was bias in the news sources, which 
could also work to underestimate the number of legislative boycotts in the dataset, in particular. 
While not a problem for this research project, the Cline Center warns that event data can also be 
biased by duplicates and over-reporting—their examples shows this is especially true if human 
researchers do not double-check the sources behind the data. The challenges that I have faced in 
constructing this dataset are reminiscent of those faced by conflict scholars now and in the past, 
showing that these problems working with event data are not particularly avoidable at the current 
state of the art. The crux of the problem is that this technology is still in its early stages; we are, 




for granted. Until then, we as researchers still need to play a significant role in turning the results 
of searches such as the one I ran in Solr into workable, valid data. 
Dependent Variables 
The above discussion highlights the process of gathering the data on legislative and 
electoral boycotts. That complicated process only generates a small portion of the variables 
needed for this study’s statistical tests. This section describes the other variables in this study, 
including the outcome variables, and explains why each of these variables is essential to the 
accurate analysis of the effect boycotts have upon democratic governance results in the long-
term. 
What one scholar means by “good democratic governance” and what another scholar 
means can vary significantly, though it is likely to contain the same normative assumptions. In 
general, those who talk about good governance are talking about a conceptualization of how well 
government works, constructing a working definition using components such as impartiality, 
capacity and autonomy, effectiveness, efficiency, and rule of law. Traditionally, these qualities 
are evaluated through experts, measured by perceptions, and ranked in accordance with our 
normative assumptions of the components we have gathered. Rothstein and Teorell argue that 
good governance means expressing a particular quality of government (QoG), defined as “the 
impartiality of institutions that exercise government authority” (2008, pg. 165).  
Also complicating attempts to study good governance is the difficulty in operationalizing 
many of the phenomena we consider to be examples of “good governance.” The World Bank 
indicators, for example, rely heavily on perceptual data from surveys. The measurement problem 
is a subject of lively debate (Rothberg 2014; Malito 2015). Additionally, one must address how 




measure or concept of governance, but the normative component of the concept itself often leads 
to blurred boundaries as scholars discuss and conceptualize these two ideas. Rothstein and 
Teorell (2008, 2012) are careful to point out that democratic institutions may be a necessary 
condition for democracy, but that scholars should take care to remind themselves that it is not a 
sufficient condition for quality of government.   
As important as the key independent variables are the dependent variables—the measures 
of good governance that will be used for this project. As discussed in the introductory chapter, in 
my dissertation “good governance” will be captured by three separate indicators, each of which 
will be discussed and analyzed in relation to the two independent variables. These indicators are 
rule of law, low corruption, and accountability. I selected these in order to capture the elements 
of good governance most closely related to the outcomes of effective performance of elites in 
governance. These variables come from the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) project. 
Initiated by Kaufmann and Kraay, the WGI consist of six composite dimensions of governance 
originally produced for the World Bank (“Documentation”). These six dimensions of good 
governances are: voice and accountability, political stability and absence of violence, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption. I have 
elected to focus on voice and accountability, rule of law, and control of corruption.  
Each of the six WGI measures are created by averaging together related and comparable 
measures from other data sources. Naturally, some of these measures were not transferable in 
their original forms. In order to make these variables work together WGI methodologists created 
a three-step process. First, the scholars had to determine which composite variable (if any) was 
the appropriate home for the original source variables. Second, the source data variables were 




variable. This process alone does not successfully make the data comparable across the different 
sourses that contribute to this project, though. In order to successfully address this, the WGI 
methodologists next used an Unobserved Components Model (UCM) to weight the average of 
each source’s individual indicators. The UCM weights the rescaled data under the assumption 
that the observed datapoints are a linear function of the unobserved level of governance plus and 
error term. This linear function varies across data sources, and the UCM uses it to weight each 
data source in the final calculation of the composite variable. It also privileges data that are more 
closely correlated with each other over data that may be inconsistent with comparable sources, in 
order to keep outlier measures from being overly influential in the average. The resulting 
estimates exhibit a normal distribution where the mean equals zero and the standard deviation is 
1. As a result, most of the observations range between -2.5 and 2.5 with higher values, again, 
corresponding to “better” exhibitions of the governance indicators.   
Rule of law, the first variable we will consider here, “captures perceptions of the extent to 
which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of 
crime and violence” (“Documentation”). Twenty-three sources were used to construct this 
variable.  
According to the documentation, the control of corruption (CC) variable “captures 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.” 
(“Documentation”). The control of corruption variable is constructed from variables from 




Finally, the voice and accountability variable (VAC) is comprised of measures of 
“perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting their 
government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media” 
(“Documentation”). VAC draws from nineteen data sources to create the composite variable.    
The largest shortcoming of the WGI, in terms of its usefulness to this project, is its 
abbreviated time period. The WGI covers a good number of countries—over 200—but it only 
does so for the period of 1996 – 2016. Therefore, I could not rely upon WGI for the entirety of 
my statistical analysis. It does, however, provide a wealth of information for those twenty years, 
and it covers many countries that other governance measures do not. On the positive side, this 
twenty-year period captures some of the most interesting events in democratic development 
around the world, as well as capturing most of the third wave of democratization as well 
(Huntington 1991).  
Universe of Cases 
In order to understand the functions of opposition parties in new democracies, we must 
clearly define the universe of cases in which the phenomenon of interest exists. When discussing 
democracies, scholars typically split them into two camps—the advanced industrialized 
democracies (Western Europe and the older democracies, most, but not all, of which were once 
colonies of Britain) and the developing democracies. The developing democracies are those that 
have emerged during the second and third waves of democracy.21 More specifically, we are 
looking at countries which were coded as “democracy” in the DD dataset after the observation 
year of 1961.22 As an extra stipulation, and in order to allow for the possibility of alternation, I 
                                                          
21 These countries are colloquially referred to as members of the third wave—however, many were democracies 
before April 25, 1974, the date which Huntington puts at the beginning of the third wave (1991, 3).  
22 I have also restricted the dataset to those countries with a population greater than one million, due to data 




include only those countries which have experienced more than one fair and free multiparty 
election (with one major exception, elaborated on below). With this limitation, our universe of 
cases is comprised of 109 countries. Over the 55-year period 1961-2016, these provide 3,151 
country-year observations.23 
There is another important consideration here, however. The DD dataset does not classify 
countries which fulfill only the first three of the four requirements of the procedural definition of 
democracy, listed above, as democracies. Instead, they are considered “Type II Errors,” or 
countries which may be democracies but are considered “false negatives” for the sake of caution, 
because there was yet no alternation in power (Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010, 70). Here, I 
include the Type II errors in my list of democracies but will control for them in most of my 
statistical analysis. I choose to include them because my interest lies in the function of 
oppositions—oppositions do not need to become government for the purpose of my study.  
Additionally, the function of opposition in these countries has the potential to be a rich source of 
knowledge on opposition actions in new democracies—we can gain a lot by understanding their 
actions in light of their inability to join government. 
Control Variables 
Alongside the key IVs, I incorporate a few additional control variables, most of which are 
widely used as controls in studies on comparative democratization. I control for these common 
variables in order to reduce their influence on the outcome variables and more clearly see the 
effects of my variables of interest on democratic governance. First, I will control for region. 
Democratization has often been viewed as a “wave” that hits different places at different times 
                                                          
23 It is important to note that, while this is the overarching universe of cases, some particular analyses draw from 
more limited date ranges, lowering the N. Deviations from the generalized universe of cases will be noted in the 




and, despite some holdouts, countries in the same region can be expected to begin 
democratization at relatively similar times (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Elkins 2010; Elkins and 
Simmons 2005; Huntington 1991). Second, I will control for wealth, in the form of GDP per 
capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity). This variable speaks to modernization theory, 
which argues that a country will become more democratic as it grows wealthier (Arat 1988; 
Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Lipset 1959), or at least that it will sustain democracy once 
achieved (Epstein et. al. 2006; Przeworski et. al. 2000). Third, I will control for regime duration, 
since studies have shown that democratic governance can become institutionalized and less 
subject to change or regression the longer it holds in a country (Svolik 2008). Finally, I control 
for regime change type since it has been shown to relate to the effectiveness of new democracy 
as well as the role of oppositions following transition (Geddes, Wright, and Franz 2014; 
O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986). 
I code region according to the World Bank classifications. The World Bank separates 
countries of the globe into six different regions, which generally corresponds to major regional 
focuses in the social sciences. These regions are Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, Europe and 
Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, and South Asia. I 
make one significant deviation from the World Bank’s grouping, though—I separate the 
countries of Eastern Europe from the Europe and Central Asia category. I do this because of the 
important empirical differences of the transitions in these countries from those of Western 
Europe. As a result, I have the following seven regions: Africa, East Asia and the Pacific, 
Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Middle East and 
North Africa, and South Asia. The World Bank is also the source for my data on GDP per capita, 




Regime duration comes straight from the Democracy and Dictatorship revisited dataset 
(Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). The dataset counts the age of each state for each year it 
does not experience a reversal from procedural democracy to authoritarianism. The last of my 
key control variables is regime change type, taken from the Geddes, Wright, and Franz data set 
(2014). This measure accounts for the type of change that led the authoritarian regime to become 
a procedurally democratic regime. There are three types of transitions that, by their nature, would 
affect the development of the new government differently. These are 1) pacted transitions, 2) 
coup, 3) revolution.  
Methodology 
Chapters Five and Six contain my statistical analyses, wherein I seek to show that 
opposition pursuit of extra-parliamentary strategies is not, as some have characterized it, a “death 
knell” for democracy, but instead can be just as valid an oppositional tactic as those we observe 
within the parliamentary setting. Here, I focus the two key independent variables—whether or 
not opposition parties have participated in electoral boycotts and whether or not opposition 
parties have participated in legislative boycotts. These chapters will contain additional theoretical 
discussion (focusing on specific characteristics of legislative and electoral boycotts, respectively) 
and the statistical analysis of these types of boycotts. The methods of statistical analysis are 
relatively simple; I will use dynamic panel data analysis of the country and country-year 
datasets. Dynamic panel data analysis allows us to see patterns both within and across country 
clusters with lagged dependent variables, as well as an overall analysis of the model. 
The statistical analysis includes the universe of cases to that discussed at the beginning of 
this chapter—109 countries, with 3,151 country-year observations. Where the qualitative 




pursue goals, the quantitative analysis seeks to show how the choice to pursue extra-
parliamentary tactics affect the liberal prospects of these states and how this relates to the 
normative ideal of oppositions. For comparative purpose, my universe of cases includes 
countries which exhibit the phenomena of interest as well as those that do not. 
Descriptive Statistics  
 Legislative Boycotts 
 My investigation in Solr produced 181 country-year observations which were positive for 
a legislative boycott. The oldest boycott in the dataset occurred in India in 1967, with boycotts 
becoming more frequent in the mid-1990s and continuing to increase throughout the next twenty 
years. 50% of the observed legislative boycotts occur after the year 2005, showing that 
legislative boycotts are either occurring more frequently or are have become more interesting 
and, therefore, have become more frequently covered in international newspapers. Of the fifty-
five years included in my dataset, twenty-six years have observed parliamentary boycotts. Only 
two of the observed boycotts occurred before 1990: India in 1967 and South Africa in 1987. 
1994 also only has one observed parliamentary boycott, which occurred in Slovakia. The year 
with the highest number of observed boycotts is 2009, when fifteen parliamentary boycotts were 
held. These boycotts were held all over the world: Albania, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Cambodia, 
India, Jamaica, Macedonia, Moldova, Namibia, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, South 
Korea, Turkey, and Uganda. From 1967 to 2016, the average number of parliamentary boycotts 
per year is 3.5, and the median is a frequency of .5. The differences here are obviously explained 
by the fact that parliamentary boycotts are rare events that slowly becoming more commonly 
observed. For just the years with observed boycotts, the mean number of boycotts each year is 




distribution of the observations is shaped, showing a strong skew to the left reflecting the rarity 
of parliamentary boycotts.  
Figure 4.1 
 
The line graph in Figure 2 shows the general increase in parliamentary boycotts since the 
end of the Cold War and the explosion in the number of new Third Wave democracies, 
especially in Eastern Europe and Asia. While there is certainly evidence in the literature for an 
increase in boycotts (both parliamentary and electoral) since the end of the Cold War, it is 
unclear to what extent the increase observed in the dataset generated by Solr using the Global 
Events Archive is reflective of the true, unknown population of parliamentary boycotts. The 
increase may flow directly from the proliferation of new democracies prone to use these tactics. 
The marked increase after the 1990s may also, however, be because the data generation methods 




This could be due to several reasons, but one of the most likely is that the potential effects of 
parliamentary boycotts were not well known and therefore the events themselves were not 
especially of interest to international newspapers. Globalization made events like parliamentary 
boycotts more pertinent to political and economic discussions around the world, and therefore 
more newsworthy.  
Figure 4.2 
 
Figure 3, below, is a map of the world showing where parliamentary boycotts occur with the 
most frequency. The darker the blue, the more electoral boycotts are observed for that country, 
going back to the earliest observed boycott in 1967. The maps show that most electoral boycotts 
are observed in Eastern Europe and Southern Asia; this is unsurprising, since even a precursory 
look at the data shows high levels of parliamentary boycotts in countries such as Albania, 




from Solr seemingly confirms some of the predicted biases—only one observation was gathered 
from Latin America (Argentina 2014), which may mean that there are several false negatives. 
Because of this issue, I will run two version of my statistical tests in the next section, one that 
will include and one that will exclude Latin America.  
 The descriptive statistics related to the parliamentary boycott variable I created here show 
several interesting features of parliamentary boycotts that deserve some further attention in 
future research endeavors. First, it appears that legislative boycotts can quickly become 
traditional modes of contention by the opposition. The Bangladesh case best illustrates this: the 
Bangladeshi opposition boycotts parliament frequently (and no matter who is in opposition) and, 
in this role, they also frequently hold performative boycotts of events like the opening of 
parliament. The legislative boycott is a tool to show anything from general displeasure with the 
leadership to intense opposition to proposed policy. In other countries, boycotts are threatened 
and negotiated; in Bangladesh, boycotts are often just expected. Therefore, once a legislative 
boycott occurs, the possibility that more boycotts will follow increases with each boycott.  



















 My investigation in Solr produces 78 country-year observations of electoral boycotts 
undertaken by opposition party candidates. The oldest observation occurred in Jamaica in 1983, 
with boycotts rare throughout the rest of the 80s and increasing after the 1990s. Patterns of these 
boycotts may be similar to those described when addressing the increase in observed legislative 
boycotts: international newspapers could be increasing their cove rage of these events, but actual 
frequency of these events may be stable. Alternatively, the rise of electoral boycotts is a function 
of the emergence of new democracies. Of the fifty-five years included in my dataset, only 
twenty-nine have observed electoral boycotts. Three occur before the 1990s, in two countries: 
Jamaica (1983) and Bangladesh (1986 and 1988). After that, there is no consistent pattern to the 
number of electoral boycotts that occur each year, which is likely due to the fact that, by 
necessity, an election needs to occur that year in order for an electoral boycott to occur. This 
greatly limits the number of possible electoral boycotts for each year. The year with the greatest 
number of electoral boycotts was 2009, at 9 boycotts. These boycotts were primarily in African 
and the Middle East: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Congo, Ghana, Malawi, Moldova, Niger, Tunisia 
and Uganda. From 1983 to 2016, the average number of boycotts per year is 1.57, with a median 
of 1. For the years with observed boycotts, the average number of parliamentary boycotts per 
year is 2.65 and the median is 2, showing a fairly consistent distribution with a slight positive 
skew. The histogram in figure 2 shows how the distribution of observed electoral boycotts is 
shaped, showing that most years observe only a couple of electoral boycotts, and that the number 









 Figure 5 is a line graph of the observed number of opposition candidate electoral boycotts 
from 1983 onward. Where the data on parliamentary boycotts showed a great increase after the 
Cold War, the changes in electoral boycotts over time are not nearly as dramatic. The 1990s and 
the early 2000s show a number of small peaks and valleys. These peaks and valleys are similarly 
frequent after 2010, though their sizes are larger. The occurrence of electoral boycotts has 
increased over time, but this is likely a relic of the increase in number of transitioning 
democracies. The Global News Archive shows reporting on electoral boycotts has been frequent 
and consistent throughout the years, likely because the opposition’s choice to boycott elections 







 Finally, I turn to the world map showing where electoral boycotts occur with the most 
frequency. The darker the orange, the more electoral boycotts are observed in that country, going 
back to the earliest observed boycott in 1983. The patterns of electoral boycotts are distinctly 
different from the patterns of parliamentary boycotts across regions. For parliamentary boycotts, 
most observations fell in Eastern Europe and South Asia. Here, though, even a precursory glance 
at the map shows that most observations occur on the African continent, with a smattering of 
observations in Eastern Europe and South Asia. We can also see that many of the countries that 
observe a high level of electoral boycotts outside of Africa also see parliamentary boycotts: for 











 After looking at the descriptive statistics for electoral boycotts it is easy to conclude that 
if parliamentary boycotts are considered rare events then electoral boycotts are even more so. 
While parsing the data, it also became evident that electoral boycotts are even more frequently 
avoided by 1) negotiations or 2) postponing elections entirely. The rarity of electoral boycotts in 
comparison to parliamentary is likely due to two predominant factors. First, electoral boycotts 
require an election to occur. While parliamentary boycotts can happen at any time for any length 
of time, an electoral boycott requires a specific event for it to occur and happens at one point in 
time. Second, electoral boycotts are significantly more costly than parliamentary boycotts. The 
outcomes of the decision to sit outside of a legislative session for a few days or a few weeks to 
demonstrate discontent with a country’s policies is not comparable to the sacrifices made by 
abstaining from electoral competition, the results of which remove a party from a place where it 
can influence policy for years at a time—potentially even causing the dissolution of the party 
itself. Legislative boycotts can be short, or largely symbolic. Electoral boycotts, on the other 
hand, require a political party to make a significant choice—which is probably why many 
electoral boycotts are threatened, but not carried out24.  
Conclusions 
 While the data I gathered from the World News Archive allowed me to put together the 
first dataset on legislative boycotts, this task came with several limitations. These limitations 
highlighted shortcoming of the data: potential country biases, missing events, and incorrect dates 
for some events. Some of these problems come from the Global News Archive itself and its 
                                                          
24 In “Threaten, but Participate,” Frankel argues that electoral boycotts are largely unsuccessful. Instead, he argues, 
the threat to boycott an election can be more successful in eliciting change from the government than the choice to 
actually carry out the boycott. He does not address, though, the fact that the “threaten, but participate” course of 
action would be limited in its use—after a couple of times, the government would no longer be convinced to give 




design, while others are the result of the identification process through Solr. These challenges 
show that constructing a reliable dataset from the Global News Archive is not a simple task. It 
requires refined specification of the Boolean syntax to return the correct types of articles. The 
process of turning these search results into useable data requires extensive human effort in 
parsing the real hits from the incorrect hits and then in verifying the accuracy of these hits. In the 
end, I was able to create a dataset that I am mostly confident in and, from here, can move on to 
discern any patterns in the outcomes of these two vitally important types of opposition tactics: 






















Chapter 5: Long-term Effects of Legislative Boycotts on Democratic Governance 
 
 Contention in the legislative setting is no new phenomenon, as we know from anecdotal 
historical evidence. The British parliament was famously designed to keep the government and 
opposition out of reach, in order to dissuade violence. A congressman in the United States beat a 
senator nearly to death in response to alleged slander the latter made in a speech on the Senate 
floor. The parliament in Taiwan, South Korea, and Ukraine are frequently seen in international 
newspapers amid reports of brawls in the legislative chamber, and some scholarly work has been 
done on the phenomenon (Batto and Tsai 2017; Gandrud 2015). The colloquialism “violence is 
not the answer” can even more frequently be seen in the interactions between government and 
opposition parties as contention becomes manifested in legislative boycotts.  
 A prime example of this occurred in the Slovak National Council in September of 2014. 
In the Slovak parliament, members from both the opposition and the government can propose 
bills for policy debate. That September, however, members of the opposition came to Parliament 
to find that ten of their bills had been removed from the agenda by the ruling Direction—Social 
Democracy party, better known as Smer. In response, the opposition removed thirty other bills 
from the docket and members from five opposition parties began to boycott25. 
 The opposition decried the “arrogance of the ruling party” in the Slovak news, but Smer 
representatives stated that they had a right to remove those ten opposition draft bills because they 
were part of the “campaign” in the upcoming election. Smer said that they could be addressed 
once the elections were over. The opposition retorted that they were constitutionally permitted to 
                                                          
25 This includes the Christian-Democratic Movement (KDH), Ordinary People and Independent Personalities 




propose bills and that the majority did not have any privilege to police what type of bills they 
proposed (Vilikovska 2014a).  
 Weeks later, the government and opposition attended an extraordinary parliamentary 
session in which government agreed to hear a few of the discarded bills. These bills asked for 
changes in elections (for example, proposing that mayoral elections become two-round elections) 
and adjustments to the rules governing MPs (that they could not hold multiple elected positions, 
that they can only make one salary paid by the government, that they could not make and 
practice law simultaneously). Despite the opposition’s success in bringing the government to the 
table to debate these bills, the Smer-dominated parliament rejected all but one bill (Vilikovska 
2014b). While the boycott was successful in getting a response from the government and the 
consideration of their bills—the primary goal of the boycott—policy change was unsuccessful. 
Still, the government was forced to retreat by the accusation that they had overstepped their 
bounds and acted undemocratically and unconstitutionally. The boycott, therefore, can be seen as 
a partial success, and the immediate challenge from the opposition showed the government that 
actions like this may not be so easy in the future.  
 In the preceding chapters, I have discussed opposition party tactics, laid out a theory of 
why we might expect that boycotts are not the danger for democracy that many other scholars 
have contended, and provided evidence in the form of case studies that support the theory at 
hand. The following section discusses the hypotheses I will test in my investigation into the 
effects of legislative boycotts on democratic governance—specifically measures of corruption, 
rule of law, and accountability.  The next section will show the results of the panel data analyses 
as well as provide three robustness checks for the primary panel data analysis. This primary 





 Here, I seek to expand upon the work of Beaulieu and show that the conventional wisdom 
that boycotts are “death knells” of democracy (2006, PG) is misguided. The dissertation overall 
seeks, at a minimum, to reject the following hypothesis in favor of the null. 
 H1: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are correlated 
with lower scores on good governance indicators.  
I am also interested in the validity of the following competing hypothesis, that: 
 H2: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are correlated 
with decreasing scores on good governance indicators.  
 
My theory supports either of these two results—the acceptance of the null or the 
acceptance of H2—as support for the claim that, in the long-term, there are many reasons why we 
would expect that boycotts will have neutral or perhaps even positive effects on the development 
of democracies in the states in my dataset. My theory follows the analysis of Beaulieu (2006), 
who puts forth the argument that boycotts can cause an increase in democratic quality by 
encouraging the government to act in a manner more accountable to the needs of the opposition 
and increase its responsiveness to their stated needs. In Chapter 2, I argue more broadly, stating 
that the movement outside of parliament can frequently give oppositions in new democracies the 
ability to transmit clearer signals of the policies they desire and the lengths to which they are 
willing to go to see them instituted. Once we switch the focus from short-term repercussions to 
the long-term, I believe we will see the negative affects discussed in the literature become 
ameliorated due to the actual mixed effects of boycotts resulting from the influence of historical 
factors and other extraneous variables that cannot be operationalized.  
This chapter, in particular, tests the following three hypotheses: 
 H3: When opposition parties choose to participate in legislative boycotts, a new 




 H4: When opposition parties choose to participate in legislative boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience a decrease in the rule of law. 
 H5: When opposition parties choose to participate in legislative boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience a decrease in level of accountability.  
The rejection of each of these hypotheses in favor of the null—that no relationship exists—will 
support my theory, as well as the acceptance of alternate hypotheses speculating that legislative 
boycotts can significantly predict an increase in the three measures of governance.  
Legislative Boycotts and Good Governance 
My primary set of tests look at the effects of legislative boycotts on three World 
Governance Indicators variables: Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, and Voice and 
Accountability. The specifics of each of these variables was detailed in Chapter 4, as well as an 
overview of the dataset itself and the mechanics behind the data formation. Here, though, I will 
briefly describe each variable again. Control of Corruption operationalized the extent to which 
public power is misused and the state is captured by political elites or private interests. Rule of 
law measures the extent to which elites are constrained by the rules of society and the people can 
have confidence that their leaders and other elites will be held accountable for violating laws. 
Voice and Accountability measures the extent to which a country’s people have a voice in 
electing representatives, and then the ability to constrain those they have elected. Each of these 
measures has a possible value of between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating “better” 
outcomes.  
Each statistical test uses the legislative boycott data I gathered from the Global News 
Archive as the key independent variable, and three-year lagged versions of Control of 
Corruption, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability as the dependent variables. As stated in 
Chapter 4, the main control variables used for this analysis are region, GDP per capita, type of 




governance indicators and the occurrence of legislative boycotts, though, I paused to run a few 
important tests of the data before attempting panel data analysis. First, I tested for 
multicollinearity. Multicollinearity exists when the values of one explanatory variable can be 
predicted by the values of another explanatory variable. While the nature of my variables did not 
suggest that this was likely (this is often considered to be a greater concern when working with 
financial data, for example), testing for this problem is important in order to determine that the 
outcomes of the statistical analysis are robust and valid. If multicollinearity exists, then the 
effects of each explanatory variable is not solely predicted by the model but may also be the 
result of the relationship between two independent variables. I tested for multicollinearity by 
running regression between each of the IVs, producing auxiliary R-squareds. The size of these R-
squareds indicates multicollinearity, with common practice setting the line at R1=.75. Each of 
the auxiliary R-squareds was far lower than this value, ranging between -0.08 and 0.218, and I 
therefore dismissed the possibility of multicollinearity in my model. 
I then tested for the possibility of autocorrelation, which is especially a concern with 
time-series data. Autocorrelation, or serial correlation, exists when the value of a variable at one 
time is correlated with its value at a second point in time. Due to the nature of my data, I had to 
forego both the standard Breusch-Godfrey test for higher order autocorrelation and Durbin-
Watson test for first-order autocorrelation in favor of the Wooldridge test for first-order 
autocorrelation, which is specially designed to run in panel data. The results of this test, where   
p = 0.00, allowed me to accept the null hypothesis that there is no first-order autocorrelation in 
my data.  
Satisfied, I began by running my specified model using panel data analysis. Before 




the effects of variables that vary across time, and I am looking at the correlation between the 
occurrence of legislative boycotts and governance indicators that vary across time, theory 
indicates I should use fixed effects in my panel data analysis. Fixed effects remove any effect of 
time-invariant characteristics of countries from the model, nullifying the effects of any static 
endogenous country characteristics that are not directly included in the model. The Hausman test 
confirms that the theoretical assumption to use fixed effects is correct in two cases; for 
consistency sake, I employ fixed effects over random effects for all regressions in both of my 
statistical chapters26.  
 The data is set using country as the panel variable and year as the time variable. Since 
these democracies vary in age and we are only interested in the time that these countries have 
spent as democracies, the data is unbalanced. This means that there may be biases in the data, 
particularly those which may be correlated with regional or cultural variables. To address this 
possibility, I tested my data for endogeneity and attrition bias using the BGLW test. The test 
shows no correlation between IVs that could lead to bias in the regression results, and no 
presence of heteroskedasticity in the models. As a result, there is no indication that these 
unbalanced panels introduce bias into the data. These results are not surprising: usually, bias with 
unbalanced panels are a concern when dealing with subject attrition in experimental studies. 





                                                          




Table 5.1: World Governance Indicators and Legislative Boycotts 
           (1)        (2)       (3) 
         Corruption       Rule of Law   Accountability  
         b/se       b/se       b/se 
Legislative Boycott  0046    -0.015     0.068 
    (0.04)     (0.04)     (0.04) 
Region27    .   .   . 
   .   .   . 
GDP Per Capita    -0.000     0.000*      -0.000*** 
          (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Transition Type    .          .          . 
          .          .          . 
Democracy Age    0.001      -0.000     0.000 
           (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Constant          -0.417***       -0.458***         -0.050* 
           (0.02)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
N          1175          1174          1059 
r2(w)         0.004      0.005      0.027 
r2(b)   0.334   0.464   0.483 
r2(o)   0.269   0.390   0.370 
sigma_u   0.635      0.615      0.768 
sigma_e   0.198      0.207      0.202 
rho        0.911      0.898      0.935 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
The results of the fixed-effects panel data analysis are shown in Table 5.1 above. While 
the original model specified region and regime change type as important variables of interest, 
they are omitted in the panel data analysis because they are included under the fixed effects 
guideline (since they are invariable throughout the panel). In each test, the occurrence of a 
legislative boycott has insignificant effects upon each of the governance variables—corruption, 
rule of law, and accountability. The overall model is also insignificant—especially within the 
panels—with the best predictor of the dependent variables being a country’s wealth, especially in 
                                                          
27 For ease in reporting, and because they are omitted, I condense the seven regions (Africa, East Asia, Eastern 




Voice and Accountability model. This is despite the widely held theories linking region, wealth, 
transition type, and age of democracy to indicators of good governance such as control of 
corruption, rule of law, and accountability. These results lead me to reject H1—that of the 
common theory regarding the effects of boycotts on governance—in favor of the null. This 
provides some support to my claims that the expectation that boycotts negatively affect the 
development of democracy is a questionable assertion. However, I executed a couple more tests 
in order to gain more confidence in the statistical results. 
Unfortunately, the World Governance Indicator data—like many datasets on 
governance—is limited. It only goes back to 1996, and there are only data provided for even 
years between 1996 and 2000. While this time period does capture a lot of my data—around 
67% of the country/year data and x% of the legislative boycotts—I conducted several robustness 
checks using other measures of corruption control and rule of law. The alternative measures of 
corruption come from the Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index and the 
Varieties of Democracy dataset. The VDem data goes back to my earliest country-year 
observations, while CPI ranges back to the mid-90s. The alternative measure of rule of law 
comes from Freedom House, which is also limited in their history of reporting. Taken with the 
results of the regressions run on the WGI indicators, however, they can be used to improve our 
confidence with the primary tests. The same can be said for the shorter-range Corruption 







Table 5.2: Robustness Check—Corruption and Legislative Boycotts 
            (1)        (2)   (3) 
            VDem Corruption        CPI28   FH Rule of Law 
            b/se       b/se   b/se 
 
Legislative Boycotts        0.001      0.139   -0.172 
           (0.01)     (0.53)   (0.13) 
Region    .   .   . 
    .   .   . 
GDP Per Capita      -0.000***         0.001***  0.000 
           (0.00)    (0.00)   (0.00) 
Transition Type   .   .   . 
    .   .   . 
Democracy Age     0.000     0.066***  -0.058*** 
           (0.00)     (0.02)   (0.01) 
Constant           0.678***         24.913***  8.855*** 
            (0.02)     (0.59)   (0.30) 
N          1609          1097   684 
r2(w)         0.027     0.207   0.063 
r2(b)    0.241   0.415   0.046 
r2(o)    0.198   0.387   0.050 
sigma_u    0.206      8.760   3.588 
sigma_e    0.067      4.046   0.732 
rho         0.905      0.824   0.960 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 The robustness checks for control of corruption shown in Table 5.2 present similar results 
to those from the primary analysis using the World Governance Indicators. The model was 
specified in the same way as in the initial test, with a lagged dependent variable of three years. 
GDP per capita remains the most significant variable, with age of democracy becoming 
significant at the p<0.01 level with the Corruption Perception Index and Freedom House Rule of 
Law as dependent variables. Legislative boycotts still have an insignificant effect upon 
corruption within the countries in my dataset, though the constant shows a positive direction of 
                                                          
28 The CPI is coded where low values indicate low corruption and high values indicate higher levels of corruption. 
Therefore, a positive coefficient shows increasing corruption while a negative coefficient shows improving control 




(the insignificant) influence for the corruption measures. Both qualities refute the generally 
accepted hypothesis and support the previous test in which I rejected H1 in favor of the null. The 
robustness checks for rule of law provides similar confirmatory evidence, though the overall 
model is a poorer fit to the data, with none of the independent variables showing significance. 
Once again, the presence of legislative boycotts has no significant effect upon the measures of 
rule of law.  
Table 5.3: Robustness Check—World Governance Indicators and Legislative Boycotts (No 
Latin America) 
            (1)        (2)    (3) 
            Corruption   Rule of Law   Accountability 
            b/se       b/se       b/se 
Legislative Boycotts        -0.001     -0.013     -0.021 
            (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
Region      .          .          . 
            .          .          . 
GDP Per Capita        0.000      0.000**    -0.000*** 
            (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Transition Type        .          .          . 
            .          .          . 
Democracy Age     -0.000     -0.002     -0.000 
            (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Constant           -0.489***         -0.449***         -0.121*** 
            (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
N           888    887   872 
r2(w)         0.000      0.013      0.027 
r2(b)    0.376   0.497   0.370 
r2(o)    0.329   0.434   0.329 
sigma_u    0.573      0.578      0.773 
sigma_e    0.210      0.218      0.215 
rho         0.882      0.876      0.928 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
As discussed on Chapter 4, the Global News Archive generally lacks news coming from 
Latin America in favor of regions of more geopolitical significance to world powers such as the 
United States and Great Britain. Because of this, the data gathered on legislative boycotts in 




confidence in the above regressions, I chose to run the analysis without Latin American 
countries, in case the potential underrepresentation of these cases affected the output of the 
statistical tests for the other regions. Dropping the Latin American states reduces my number of 
observations by 891, and also removes many of the oldest new democracies from my dataset.  
The results of this analysis are in line with each of the tests previously discussed in this 
chapter. Even with the Latin American observations excluded, for fear that an 
underrepresentation of the phenomenon of interest could be biasing the results, the insignificant 
results provide no evidence supporting the claim that we should expect legislative boycotts to 
have adverse effects on democratic governance. Since excluding Latin America does not lead to 
different outcomes, this robustness check will not be conducted in the following chapter.  
Legislative Boycotts and the Development of Good Governance 
 The above section tested the relationship between the level of three indicators of good 
governance—control of corruption, rule of law, and accountability—and the occurrence of 
legislative boycott. The statistical analysis produced no evidence that these indicators are 
affected by the presence or absence of boycotts, with each test supporting the null hypothesis that 
there is no relationship. This section expands upon the first tests to ask, instead, if the occurrence 
of legislative boycotts affect the rate at which these indicators change throughout the years. 
Might the occurrence of legislative boycotts be more closely linked to either the degradation or 
improvement of either of these indicators instead of simply being related to higher or lower 
levels of control of corruption, rule of law, or accountability?  
 In this section, I test the following three hypotheses. Once again, these hypotheses are 
written to correspond with the predominantly accepted theory that boycotts are fundamentally 




H6: When opposition parties choose to participate in legislative boycotts, the level of 
control of corruption in a new democracy will decrease. 
H7: When opposition parties choose to participate in legislative boycotts, the level of rule 
of law in a new democracy will decrease. 
H8: When opposition parties choose to participate in legislative boycotts, the 
accountability in a new democracy will decrease. 
As in the previous section, I tested these hypotheses using a panel data analysis 
employing the age of democracy, region, GDP per capita, and type of transition as control 
variables. The dichotomous measure of whether a boycott occurred that year is, once again, the 
key independent variable. The dependent variable takes the measure of the governance indicator 
during the year of interest (x) and subtracts it from the measurement of the same indicator three 
years later (x+3).  
Table 5.4: Change in World Governance Indicators and Legislative Boycotts 
         (1)        (2)        (3) 
            Corruption     Rule of Law    Accountability 
             b/se       b/se       b/se 
Legislative Boycotts       0.005      0.006      -0.023 
            (0.03)     (0.02)     (0.03) 
GDP Per Capita         -0.000     -0.000     -0.000 
            (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Region      .          .          . 
           .          .          . 
Transition Type        .          .          . 
            .          .          . 
Age of Democracy   -0.000     -0.000     0.001 
            (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Constant           0.057*      0.038      -0.025 
            (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
N           970    969    955 
r2          0.005      0.001      0.004 
r2(b)    0.001   0.001   0.000 
r2(w)    0.001   0.000   0.000 
sigma_u    0.094      0.086      0.090 
sigma_e    0.172      0.152      0.172 
rho        0.230      0.244      0.212 




 The results in Table 5.5, above, like those in the primary analysis, show support for my 
assertions that the generally held belief on how boycotts affect democratic development may be 
inaccurate. As in the previous test, the model lacks significance, particularly pertaining to the 
key independent variable; in other words, there is no statistical link between the observance of a 
legislative boycott and the perceived value of control over corruption, rule of law, and 
accountability, as measured by the World Governance Indicators.  
Conclusions 
 This chapter contained the first large-N inquest into the long-term effects of legislative 
boycotts upon democratic development, measured by the World Governance Indicator’s control 
of corruption, rule of law, and accountability variables. The primary analysis looked at the 
relationship between legislative boycotts and the value of each of the governance variables after 
three years. The fixed-effects panel data analysis showed that there is no significant statistical 
relationship between the primary IV and the DVs; the robustness checks, using other measures of 
control of corruption and rule of law, supported the initial results. Statistical analysis also 
showed that there was no relationship between the change in control of corruption, rule of law, 
or accountability and the occurrence of a legislative boycott.  
 Therefore, we accept the null hypothesis that the occurrence of legislative boycotts does 
not affect the development of good governance in new democracies. We cannot expect a priori to 
see any difference between the governance outcomes of those states that experience legislative 
boycotts and those that do not. This means we fail to accept both the hypotheses that support the 
general belief about that boycotts have generally negative consequences (H1 and H2) and the 
alternative hypotheses I proposed, relying on my discussion in Chapter 2. The failure to reject 




extra-parliamentary tactics are fundamentally bad for democracy. These results are consistent 
with the proposition that democratic outcomes are variable, with some cases seeing improvement 
while others may experience a negative effect. The following chapter, which addresses the 
consequences of electoral boycotts, will provide the rest of the information needed to make a 


















Chapter 6: Long-term Effects of Electoral Boycotts on Democratic Governance 
 
In 2007, the Senegalese opposition called for an electoral boycott under allegations of 
fraud in President Abdoulaye Wade’s election earlier that year. The rationale for this boycott and 
the demands by the opposition were almost textbook: the opposition declared that there had been 
electoral fraud during that year’s presidential election, which was largely the result of a doctored 
electoral roll29. Rewmi party spokesman Yankhoba Seydi framed the discourse of the boycott by 
stating “Let’s talk about the rules. There are many things that are wrong in the registration 
process. Let us check the multiple cards that [are] issued for the voters” (Tran 2009a). They 
called for the electoral roll to be revised as well as for the establishment of an independent 
electoral commission. 
The choice to qualify the boycott as “almost” textbook comes from a secondary point of 
contention from the opposition: the rules governing the re-establishment of the Senegalese 
Senate by President Wade (the leader of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS)). Wade’s 
government had dissolved the Senate in 2000 in favor of a unicameral legislative chamber and, 
in 2007, had re-established the chamber under different electoral and composition rules.30 It was 
the Senate elections that the opposition was boycotting; they alleged that the chamber itself was 
unfair because, as opposition coalition leader Moustapha Fall stated, there was no reason for the 
opposition to run for a Senate seat. As designed, 65% of the Senate seats would be appointed by 
the President. The government states that this was to ensure that quotas—such as those for 
                                                          
29 It is important to note that, despite the opposition’s allegations, both internal and international election monitors 
had certified the presidential election as fair. This is despite some minor allegations of an uneven playing field: for 
example, the ruling party generally had greater access to the media than the opposition parties (Tran 2009a).  




women representatives and minorities—would be met31. The opposition argued, instead, that this 
design was meant to ensure the President’s party’s control over the legislature (Tran 2009b). 
In the short-term, the boycott resulted in a Senate that was dominated by Wade’s PDS 
party, which had won all the plurality seats and much of the proportional seats. Turnout was 
lower than past elections, likely a result of the number of boycotting parties, perceived unfairness 
of the election, and the resulting restriction of vote choice resulting in unmeaningful vote choice 
(Birch 2010). Looking at these immediate results, political scientists investigating electoral 
boycotts in the short-term would likely adopt a pessimistic view of the effects this boycott has on 
democracy. For example, when discussing the possible outcomes of the boycott a representative 
of the US-based National Democratic Institute said that these outcomes would reduce the 
legitimacy of the government and potentially damage democracy in Senegal (Tran 2006a). In the 
more than a decade after this election, though, democracy in Senegal has not been significantly 
affected: there have been no significant drops in governance measures—in fact, there have been 
some increases—and there has been political alternation in the executive and the legislature. This 
is far from the “death knell” for democracy that Beaulieu (2010) used to characterize the 
predominant belief on boycotts’ effects. Seeing this, what can we expect to come from electoral 
boycotts? 
It is important to remember that while my investigation shows that legislative boycotts 
are far more common than electoral boycotts, the literature on electoral boycotts significantly 
outnumbers that on legislative boycotts.  This is unsurprising: as rarer events, electoral boycotts 
are more potentially consequential and hence more newsworthy. Also, the fact that boycotting an 
                                                          
31 There is evidence to support that this may be at least partially the intention. The government had intended to 
reopen the Senate with a legal quota of 50% representation for women on the candidate lists. This law had been 




election can come at a much greater cost than boycotting the legislature makes it a more 
attractive subject of study. Electoral boycotts are also much more likely to occur when a state has 
difficulty holding free and fair elections or, at least, elections that are perceived to be free and 
fair. As a result, the implication is that electoral boycotts are a much better indicator of how 
democratic development is progressing in a country. 
Because of this, we have a greater understanding of why electoral boycotts happen and 
when they will occur. Electoral boycotts are not very common, but partial boycotts of the 
opposition happen more often than full opposition boycotts. For example, in a country with high 
ethnic tensions, such as Macedonia or Bulgaria, it would be more likely for ethnic minority 
parties to threaten to or carry out a boycott of an election than it would be for the entire 
opposition to decide to boycott. We also see that flawed elections are much more likely to be 
boycotted: Lindberg finds that 55-60% of elections that he defines as flawed are boycotted by the 
opposition, while only 10% of free and fair elections are boycotted (Lindberg 2004). This is 
unsurprising: opposition participation naturally increases the level of competition and turnout for 
an election: Lindberg even notes that opposition participation is a greater predictor of 
competition level and participation than whether or not an election is free and fair (ibid.). 
Electoral quality is also the greatest indicator of whether or not an election will be boycotted, 
with opposition parties most likely to cite fraud or the need for electoral reforms as reasons why 
they choose to boycott and election (Beaulieu 2006; Bratton 1998; Kelley 2011; Lindberg 2006; 
Pastor 1998). Beaulieu (2006) qualifies this: major boycotts are typically undertaken because of 





Perhaps naturally, my universe of cases of electoral boycotts heavily favors those Type II 
errors in the CGV dataset: those countries which may be democracies but have not reached the 
requirement of an alternation. After all, electoral boycotts are more common when elections are 
perceived to be unfair.   
The preceding chapter tested several hypotheses about the effects of legislative boycotts 
on good governance; this chapter conducts a very similar investigation, focused on electoral 
boycotts. There has been a lot of previous work on the effects of electoral boycotts, though these 
were largely limited to short-run problems. My investigation looks at the long-run effects 
electoral boycotts can have on measures of governance. In the following section, I lay out the 
hypotheses that I will test in my study of the effects of electoral boycotts on the World 
Governance Indicators on corruption, rule of law, and accountability. After that, I will discuss 
the results of the panel data analyses, as well as the same three robustness checks that I 
conducted in Chapter 5.  
Hypotheses 
 The hypotheses guiding the investigation in this chapter are nearly identical to those in 
the previous chapter on legislative boycotts; therefore, the discussion here will be abbreviated. 
Before proceeding to the chapter-specific chapters, though, it is prudent to highlight the 
dissertations’ overall hypothesis and its alternatives once more. 
 H0: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are not correlated 
with improved scores on good governance indicators.  
H1: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are correlated 
with lower scores on good governance indicators. 
 H2: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are correlated 




 The results in the previous chapter’s analysis of legislative boycotts pointed toward the 
overall acceptance of the null hypothesis of no relationship between extra-parliamentary actions; 
however, in order to confirm the acceptance of the null I must also test my second type of tactic 
in the same manner. Therefore, I test the following three hypotheses, once again using a fixed-
effects panel data analysis: 
H3: When opposition parties choose to participate in electoral boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience lower measures of control over corruption. 
H4: When opposition parties choose to participate in electoral boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience lower measures of rule of law.  
H5: When opposition parties choose to participate in electoral boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience lower measures of level of accountability.  
Each of these has a corresponding alternate hypothesis, stemming from the theory 
proposed in Chapter 2, which allows for electoral boycotts to lead to an increase in democratic 
development, addressed by specific measures of good governance.  
Electoral Boycotts and Good Governance 
 As with Chapter 5, this set of statistical tests use the World Governance Indicators 
Control of Corruption, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability, Rule of Law as the 
dependent variables. I test to see what effects the occurrence of an electoral boycott has upon the 
outcome variables, controlling for four key variables: GDP per capita, type of regime change, 
region, and age of democracy. The electoral boycott data comes from my work with the Global 
News Archive and is a dichotomous variable.  
 Once again, I ran a few tests before the panel data analysis. I first tested for 
multicollinearity by producing auxiliary R-squareds. Each of the auxiliary R-squares was lower 
than the like at R1=.75, leading me to reject the notion that there was multicollinearity present in 




concern with time-series data. I used the Wooldridge test for first-order autocorrelation, the 
results of which showed me that there was no first-order autocorrelation in my data.  
 Satisfied that this data didn’t require me to make any special accommodations to my test, 
I proceeded as I did with the panel data analysis of the effects of legislative boycotts. I ran a 
Hausman test to confirm that, like in my previous chapter, a fixed effects model was the best 
specification for my panel data analysis. The Hausman test confirmed this again. I then set the 
data using country as the panel variable and year as the time variable. Since my country/year 
variables did not change from the previous analysis, the panels remain unbalanced and I tested 
for endogeneity and attrition bias again, for good measure. There was no indication of potentially 
biasing correlation between IVs or heteroskedasticity in the panels; once again, this was 
















Table 6.1: World Governance Indicators and Electoral Boycotts 
           (1)        (2)        (3) 
           Corruption      Rule of Law       Accountability 
           b/se      b/se       b/se 
Electoral Boycott  -0.002            -0.015     -0.020 
           (0.03)        (0.03)     (0.03) 
Region    .                          .         . 
           .             .          . 
GDP Per Capita  -0.000         0.000*      -0.000*** 
           (0.00)        (0.00)     (0.00) 
Transition Type    .             .          . 
           .             .          . 
Democracy Age    0.001           -0.000     0.000 
           (0.00)        (0.00)     (0.00) 
Constant           -0.416***             -0.457***         -0.046*** 
           (0.02)        (0.03)     (0.03) 
N          1175              1174          1159 
r2(w)        0.002       0.005      0.024 
r2(b)   0.318   0.460   0.466 
r3(o)   0.270   0.385   0.372 
sigma_u   0.635         0.615      0.768 
sigma_e   0.198         0.207      0.202 
rho        0.911         0.898      0.935 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
  
Table 6.1, above, shows the results of the fixed-effects panel data analysis. Once again, 
despite the fact that region and regime change type are theoretically important to my model the 
use of fixed effects leads to their omission, since they are invariable. The tests for the outcome 
variables of control of corruption and rule of law produce results very similar to those in Chapter 
5. With the exception of GDP per capita, the only part of the model with significance is the 
constant, and the coefficients are small. The significance of GDP per capita in Test 3 reflects the 
analyses in Chapter 5, and the belief in the literature of the important effects of wealth on 
democratization. The direction of the coefficient on the dependent variable suggests that the 




stated above, the explanatory variable is insignificant so there is no evidence that it doesn’t, in 
fact, affect the indicators of good governance. 
Table 6.2: Robustness Check—Control of Corruption and Electoral Boycotts 
             
(1)        (2)   (3) 
         VDem: Corruption CPI   Freedom House 
            b/se       b/se   b/se 
Electoral Boycott   -0.002     1.149   -0.015 
            (0.01)     (0.81)   (0.16) 
Region             .   .   . 
                   .   .   . 
GDP Per Capita         -0.000***         0.001***  0.000 
            (0.00)     (0.00)   (0.00) 
Transition Type             .   .   . 
    .                  .   . 
Democracy Age     0.000      0.065**   -0.060*** 
            (0.00)     (0.02)   (0.01) 
Constant           0.672***         24.907***  8.858*** 
            (0.02)     (0.59)   (0.30) 
N          1609          1097   684 
r2(w)         0.027      0.209   0.060  
r2(b)    0.241   0.412   0.048 
r2(o)    0.198   0.385   0.052 
sigma_u    0.206      8.775   3.588 
sigma_e    0.067      4.043   0.733 
rho         0.905      0.825   0.960 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 As in Chapter 5, I conducted three robustness checks. I present these in order to bolster 
the findings from my primary test, due to the historical limitations of the WGI data. While some 
of these variables are similarly limited, the presence of some longer-run measures along with 
measures of similar length that are gathered differently could work to support the findings in 
table 6.1, if they present similar stories. Table 6.2, above, presents the results of the robustness 
checks control of corruption and electoral boycotts. Like the robustness check in Chapter 5, the 
alternative corruption and rule of law measures are not affected by the presence or absence of 
electoral boycotts. The coefficients are relatively small and entirely insignificant. In the 
corruption tests, however, we see that, while our variable of interest is insignificant, GDP per 




corruption is in a state. The coefficients for these variables, however, provide conflicting 
accounts of the effects of electoral boycotts. However, while indicators for control variables vary 
from the regressions run on the WGI data, the direction and significance of electoral boycotts 
remains the same—insignificant.  
 While there are some differences in the models, the robustness checks support the 
preliminary finding that electoral boycotts have no discernable overall effect on the development 
of aspects of good governance when related to control of corruption or the rule of law. As a 
result, we have to reject H3 and H4 in favor of the null that electoral boycotts have neither the 
detrimental effect upon these key traits of democracy that is proposed in the common theory on 
the effects of boycotts on democracy nor the potential for growth that I proposed as a possibility 
in Chapter 2.  
Legislative Boycotts and the Development of Good Governance 
Finally, I once again test to see if the change in control of corruption, rule of law, and 
accountability is related to the occurrence of electoral boycotts. The first set of hypotheses 
specify what the common theory on electoral boycotts would propose. The second set of three 
corresponds to the theory proposed in Chapter 2, which proposes the possibility that boycotts can 
elicit positive outcomes in new democracies.  
H6: When opposition parties choose to participate in electoral boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience a decrease in control of corruption. 
H7: When opposition parties choose to participate in electoral boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience a decrease in rule of law. 
H8: When opposition parties choose to participate in electoral boycotts, a new 
democracy will experience a decrease in accountability.  
As with the overall hypotheses, rejection of these hypotheses corresponds with the 




null of no relationship or the alternative hypotheses linking an increase in the three governance 
variables and electoral boycotts will support the theoretical framework established in Chapter 2.  
Table 6.3: Change in World Governance Indicators and Electoral Boycotts 
            (1)        (2)        (3) 
          Corruption      Rule of Law  Accountability 
            b/se       b/se       b/se 
Electoral Boycott   -0.019     -0.002     0.026 
            (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.04) 
GDP Per Capita       -0.000*    -0.000     -0.000 
            (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Region      .          .          . 
            .          .          . 
Transition Type        .          .          . 
            .          .          . 
Democracy Age    -0.000     -0.000     0.001 
            (0.00)     (0.00)     (0.00) 
Constant           0.059*      0.039      -0.029 
            (0.03)     (0.03)     (0.03) 
N           970    969    955 
r2(w)         0.005     0.001      0.003 
r2(b)    0.001   0.002   0.000 
r2(o)    0.001   0.000   0.000 
sigma_u    0.094      0.086      0.089 
sigma_e    0.172      0.152      0.172 
rho         0.231      0.245      0.210 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Again, the results of the statistical analysis make us unable to reject the null hypothesis 
that no relationship exists between change in good governance indicators and the occurrence of 
electoral boycotts. This indicates that there is no inherent attribute of electoral boycotts that 
causes them to negatively affect democracy or democratic development, necessitating the 
rejection of the commonly held belief that boycotts are bad for democracy (at least, in the long-
run). There is also no indication that my alternative proposal—that the signals sent by opposition 
parties when they choose to boycott can facilitate the development of good governance—can be 





 The set of fixed-effects panel data analyses summarized in Tables 6.1-6.3 show that there 
is often no statistical relationship between electoral boycotts and either the observed level of 
governance indicator or the observed change in governance indicators after three years. We 
cannot expect to see any difference in measure of democratic governance when a party protests 
by refusing to field a candidate and when it does not. To highlight a few reasons why this may 
be, I will return to my discussion in Chapter Two. First, electoral boycotts may not hinder 
democratic development because they allow opposition parties to draw attention to their 
grievances in a dramatic fashion. This not only highlights the opposition’s discontent for the 
government but can also work to draw the eye of the international system. This attention can 
frequently bring outside pressure for reform, something that is even more influential on countries 
that have or aspire to membership in certain intergovernmental associations, such as the 
European Union or NATO.  
 Second, electoral boycotts are the stronger of the two signals discussed in this 
dissertation, as mentioned when discussing the potential consequences of undergoing electoral 
boycotts. The choice to threaten or undertake an electoral boycott can prevent deterioration of 
democratic quality by prompting the government to either write new laws, change laws or to 
better abide by the legislation on record (Beaulieu 2006). For example, electoral boycotts are 
often undertaken when the opposition is troubled by aspects of the electoral system. There is 
common evidence of the government choosing to update the electoral roll or change the electoral 
formula after boycotted elections; such changes can prevent a democracy from decaying in a new 





 The discussion of the outcomes of our tests of H1 and H2 is reserved for the conclusion 
chapter, which will follow this chapter. Now, though, it is prudent to reassert that we have failed 
to reject the null hypotheses associated with H3, H4, H6. H7, and H8. The results of the panel data 
analysis also prompt us to reject the null and H5 in favor of the alternative hypothesis that 
countries that experience an electoral boycott will also experience and increase in accountability. 
Although there were mixed results, evidence still supports the assertion that, overall, we cannot 
expect countries that experience electoral boycotts to present different quality of governance than 















Chapter 7: Conclusions on an Exploratory Analysis of the Long-Term Effects of Extra-
Parliamentary Tactics on Good Governance 
 
In this dissertation, I designed and executed a preliminary investigation into the effects of 
extra-parliamentary opposition tactics, particularly electoral and parliamentary boycotts, on the 
development of democratic governance, in the long term. To date, the predominant scholarly 
opinion on the use of extra-parliamentary tactics was highly critical of their appropriateness and 
utility. Scholars such as Lindberg (2006; 2006a) and Kelly (2001) posit that electoral boycotts 
damage democracy in several ways, first by affecting the quality of elections and limiting the 
level of representation in the government. Secondly, they remove viable parties from the 
electoral contest, which reduces the occurrence of alternations—a definitional aspect of 
democracy in the formulation of Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010). Next, they believe that 
oppositions undertaking boycotts signal a weakness in institutional legitimacy, which may then 
trickle down to affect the public’s confidence in democratic rule.  
Finally, accountability and governance can be negatively affected by how legislative 
boycotts can limit representation and deliberation in democracy (Spary 2013). This project was 
designed to challenge this point-of-view by undertaking a large-scale investigation of electoral 
and legislative boycotts in new democracies, focusing on their effects from the lens of a 
functional role of opposition parties rather than the challenger role. In other words, I sought to 
determine if an opposition that pursues extra-parliamentary tactics to achieve its goals really 
does hamper its ability to work effectively within democratic institutions and, by extension, the 
ability of democratic institutions to function as they should.  
I began this dissertation by discussing oppositions and how they form goals and choose 




signal, the boycott, has the potential to circumvent issues in the development of democratic 
governance by improving lines of communication and sending more accurate information on the 
opposition’s goals and what they are willing to do to reach them. 
In Chapter 5 I specified two hypotheses to guide this dissertation. The first hypothesis 
follows the general assumptions about the effects of boycotts on democracy, linking extra-
parliamentary tactics with poorer performance in governance. The second hypothesis 
corresponds with my alternative arguments in Chapter 3, linking extra-parliamentary tactics with 
increases in measures of governance.  
H1: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are correlated 
with lower scores on good governance indicators.  
 
H2: Extra-parliamentary tactics by the opposition in new democracies are correlated 
with decreasing scores on good governance indicators.  
Chapters 5 and 6 discussed the results of the statistical analysis for legislative boycotts 
and electoral boycotts, respectively. Now, I bring these two sets of results together to see the 
overall picture of the effects of extra-parliamentary tactics on good governance outcomes. Each 
of these chapters tested six different hypotheses. The first set of three was concerned with the 
levels of governance indicators in the cases of control of corruption, rule of law, and 
accountability, respectively. The second set of three tested the relationship between the change in 
control of corruption, rule of law, and accountability and the occurrence of boycotts.  
The first hypothesis, which corresponds with the predominant opinion on the effects of 
boycotts, states that there would be a correlation between the occurrence of boycotts and lower 
scores on good governance indicators. The results shown in Tables 5.1 and 6.1 indicate that H1 
should be rejected in favor of the null hypothesis, in general. Specifically, this holds for all tests 
of the WGI and legislative boycotts and the relationship between corruption, rule of law, and 




hypothesis that extra-parliamentary tactics are correlated with higher measures of accountability. 
As stated above, though, the evidence from statistical analysis overwhelmingly supports the 
statement that there is no significant difference between WGI scores in countries that did and 
those that did not experience a legislative or electoral boycott. Robustness checks using 
alternative measures of rule of law and control of corruption bolster this conclusion. 
If extra-parliamentary tactics are not related to the observed governance scores, they 
might still support the general opinion on boycotts and democracy and cause a decrease in 
government scores. I tested a three-year change in measures of control of corruption, rule of law, 
and accountability to see if there was support for H2. The analyses in both chapters show that 
there is no significant relationship between this three-year change in governance indicators in the 
states that do and those that do not experience electoral or legislative boycotts. Once again, 
robustness checks lend support to the choice to reject H2 in favor of the null of no relationship.  
Therefore, the results of my statistics chapters present no support for the predominant 
belief that opposition parties can damage governance and hurt democracy in states that have 
recently transitioned from authoritarianism. Countries with opposition parties that undertake 
extra-parliamentary tactics do not fare any worse or any better than those that do not have parties 
that take such initiatives, on average. The results of this initial foray into the relationship 
between oppositions who work outside of parliament and long-term measures of democratic 
governance are null but theoretically interesting. By providing evidence that refutes the generally 
accepted perspective on extra-parliamentary tactics, we can begin to move past a condemnation 
of the approach and into a more nuanced understanding of when and how these tactics can be 






 This research project presents one of the most extensive studies of the effects of extra-
parliamentary tactics to date, by focusing on legislative and electoral boycotts by opposition 
parties and determining what long-term effects they might have on democratic development. 
Where my statistical analysis indicated no significant pattern of relationship between boycotts 
and democratic governance, I provided a rationale for why we might expect this relationship to 
be different than that in the predominant theoretical expectation. My case study analysis also 
showed that there are occasions in which a boycott, if effectively undertaken, can have positive 
repercussions on democratic governance. Together, each case study and the statistical analysis 
suggests a widely varied possibility of effects of an opposition’s choice to embrace extra-
parliamentary tactics, with the case study indicating that targeted goals, infrequent choice to 
pursue extra-parliamentary tactics, and international pressure can increase the likelihood of 
positive outcomes. Overall, this project provides a unique contribution to the study of opposition 
parties and has implications for our understandings of emerging democracies and the process of 
consolidation.  
 A second notable contribution of this dissertation is derived from my use of media-based 
event data. With no existing dataset on legislative boycotts, and the difficulty in gathering this 
data posed by the wide range of frequency and newsworthiness of these events from country to 
country, I turned to the Global News Archive. My time constructing this dataset highlighted the 
values and pitfalls of data generation through media-based event data, which is growing in 
importance as a source of statistical data (Wang et. al. 2016). However, media-based event data 
is primarily used to study war and other instances of violence, though its use in the mass 




arena I was able to highlight many of the issues that are still present in the technique in hope of 
raising awareness of these challenges for researchers looking to employ this tactic in the future.  
Weaknesses 
 While this study has taken large steps in establishing our understanding of the effects of 
opposition extra-parliamentary tactics on democratic development, there are still several 
shortcomings that must be addressed before the study is concluded. Chapter 4 highlighted several 
weaknesses with the large-N statistical data that must be restated here. First, the Global News 
Archive, as a collection of several worldwide newspapers has some inherent bias in the cases 
they report due to their nature as convenience samples. Both FBIS and SWB favor different 
countries, but both under-represent the Latin American cases. The gaps in information was rather 
simple to fill for the cases of electoral boycotts, as these tend to be more newsworthy; however, 
there could be many instances of Latin American legislative boycotts that are missing data.  
Regarding my case studies, I think that their greatest weakness comes from the reliance 
on news events as the primary data source. Many of these news articles are repetitive, meaning 
that there was only so much information available on each case; I had, at some points, considered 
other cases but was unable to gather enough information to adequately investigate these boycotts. 
These case studies could have been greatly bolstered by field work, particularly interviews with 
opposition party members and leaders. This would have further emphasized the decision-making 
that went into the boycotts, interactions between the relevant parties, and other processes and 
events key to determining the outcomes of each boycott. However, no funding was available for 
field research and my inquiry had to settle for news accounts of boycotts along with some 





Possibilities for Future Inquiry 
 This dissertation is a preliminary investigation of the functional role of opposition parties 
and the quality of that role and its effects on governance after an opposition chooses to pursue 
extra-parliamentary tactics. As such, it creates a foundation for many additional avenues of 
inquiry in future research projects. These should be guided by the more extended case studies 
mentioned in the preceding section: by carrying out field research and interviews with opposition 
parties and their leaders, we can understand much more about the motivations for and decision-
making process in undertaking extra-parliamentary tactics. This will provide more evidence in 
studying the framing of these tactics and the effects, beyond what we can learn from the short 
news articles that inform the bulk of the data for this project. Extended case studies, bolstered 
with additional information from field research, would shed more light on the causal mechanisms 
at hand and increase our confidence in the results of the study.  
 It would also be interesting to extend this study beyond its focus on boycotts to the other 
extra-parliamentary tactics mentioned in Table 2.1. These are 1) criticizing the government party 
in the media, 2) criticizing government policy in the media, 3) calling for protests, and 4) 
participating in protests. Such a path will expand our ability to answer the question of whether 
extra-parliamentary paths of opposition impede the development of democracy in its substantive 
definition—i.e. good governance, rule of law, and accountability. Understanding the dynamics 
surrounding the opposition in its function role can allow us to determine how well opposition 
parties in new democracies can reach those political goals scholars epitomize in classic forms of 
parliamentary democracy—representation, responsiveness, accountability, rule of law, and other 
aspects of good governance—through extra-parliamentary tactics. As with boycotts, limited 




change or abandon policies, or even step down (Blondel 1997; Lindberg 2004; Morgenstern et. 
al. 2008; Ryan 2011). These tactics have the potential to level the playing field in new 
democracies, even in political environments where institutions limit the ability of co-governance 
and other typical tactics available to opposition parties. This can shed light on the nuances of 
alternative models of opposition, and upon when and where extra-parliamentary models can 
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